Ethiopia” Djibouti discussed the co-operation of the 2 countries

Addis Ababa, December 6, 2018 (FBC) – Ethiopia’s State Minister for Foreign Affairs Hirut Zemene held talks in Djibouti today with Mahmoud Ali Yousouf, Foreign Minister of Djibouti.

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Commending the leadership of Djibouti for its unwavering commitment to heighten the symbolic ties with its sisterly country Ethiopia, Hirut expressed her Government’s keenness to further map out arrays of cooperation between the two countries.

She also underscored the need to further cement the ongoing remarkable economic integration by properly exploiting the unique people to people ties.

Praising the unremitting endeavors of the Ethiopian Government to put the ties to a higher gear, Mahmoud noted that his Government would continue to commit itself to regional cooperation in a bid to finally witness the integration Africa sought to win.

The two sides held discussions on issues such as the expansion of the electrified Ethio-Djibouti Railway, construction of a fuel pipeline, the Dkihil-Galafi road that is expected to be fully operational by the end of next year.

They have also deliberated ways of deepening the already excellent cooperation on bilateral as well as regional issues, according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.download (2)

Eritrean President isaias afawerki will soon visit to Djibouti

Addis Ababa, December 6, 2018 (FBC) -Djibouti’s foreign minister on Wednesday said Eritrean President Isaias Afeworki will pay a visit to his country “soon”.

Djibouti and Eritrea have been maintaining high level contacts after Ethiopia’s recommendation for a region-wide thaw was accepted across the board.

“We don’t have a date yet, but the two presidents will exchange visits soon,” Mahamoud Ali Youssouf told Anadolu Agency in an exclusive interview as he attended Ethiopian Day organized on the sidelines of the ongoing 2nd Djibouti International Trade Fair.

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“The two presidents met in September and I met my Eritrean counterpart. We will build on that momentum. Confidence should be built,” he said.

“Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed is launching initiatives that create conducive environment for the reconciliation and he broadened the scope of the stability and prospect for peace in the region,” he said.

Youssouf said, “This has to be acknowledged and recognized [because] the prime minister has been instrumental in the new momentum.”

He described the region as the most volatile in Africa.

“In comparison with other regions in Africa, this region [the Horn of Africa] has been trapped in a number of crises; some of them internal like the case in Somalia, and some external like the case between Eritrea and Djibouti.

“I think that we needed a visionary leader who could think regional and see the opportunities for countries to come together, plan together, and work for the benefit of the people of the region,” Youssouf added.

“We are very optimistic, he said, “Because we have seen the first signals of the development of the situation. In the future we will see more of it.”

Relations between Eritrea and Djibouti have been tense since the 1980s due to land claims.

In June 2008, the two countries fought a three-day war after Djibouti claimed that Eritrean forces dug trenches on its side of the border.

Somaliland’s Stakes In A Fast Changing Horn Of Africa – Professor Ahmed I. Samatar

As most observers acknowledge, seismic changes are now underway in the Horn of Africa. As a result of an unexpected rise of a new Ethiopian prime minister, Abiy Ahmed Ali, from the Oromo ethnic group, a novel and breathtaking vision is swirling in the region.

This surging paradigmatic shift is already impacting on both the Ethiopian domestic and regional political topographies. In the case of the first, dramatic and positive changes in the relationship between the Ethiopian state and its richly diverse citizenry is unfolding.

Among the most significant are: (a) the selection of an Oromo person to head the government for the first time in the history of modern Ethiopia, (b) the appointment of women to half of his cabinet, (c) a new and fresh invitation for the resistant Amhara community to reenter peaceful and civic national politics, (d) the immediate release of notable political prisoners, (e) a reassertion of popular participation and freedom of expression, and (f) an overall re-­‐energizing of democratic governance. On the wider regional front, the implications are even more notable.

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First, a daring breakthrough with regard to the long, bitter, and violent stalemate between Ethiopia and Eritrea has been swiftly promulgated. In this context, a satisfactory settlement over the contentious border between the two countries has now ushered in an unconstrained travel and trade between the two peoples.

Second, the Prime Minister and the long-­‐serving and authoritarian President of Eritrea, Isaias Afwerki, have publicly stated that the two countries will support the integrity of the sovereignty of Somalia.

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Third, Mr. Ahmed has underscored the urge to move the Horn of Africa towards a larger and more integrated developmental agenda. Add these together, and more, the new initiatives are not only exhilarating but, more importantly and if made to bear fruit, could transform the region from its current profile as the epitome of ubiquitous hunger, disease, ignorance, insecurity, malignant sectarianism, and vulnerability to old and new outside manipulations to one of rising quality of well being, collective confidence, and emerging cosmopolitanism. In short, kudos to Prime Minister Ahmed — he has triggered potentially colossal changes that are at once worth encouraging and watching with great interest.

SOMALILAND’S VIBRANT AND PEACEFUL ELECTION

Another historic happening took place in the Republic of Somaliland: the successful national presidential election of November 2017. The three established and constitutionally permitted political parties –i.e. Wadani, Ucid, and the ruling Kulmiye, contested for the much-­‐delayed presidency of the country. Notwithstanding a heavy and regressive dose of tribalist small-­‐mindedness, particularly by Wadani and Kulmiye, the nearly month-­‐long campaign was generally spirited and composed.

Furthermore, when polling day arrived, the country was calm and the process concluded with impressive orderliness. Kulmiye won decisively, by over eighty thousand votes (around 54% of the total) beyond its closest and major competitor Wadani. During the immediate aftermath, the leadership of Wadani had expressed bitter concern over the voting process and accused it of electoral fraudulence, as well as pointed out an illegitimate and blatant use of the financial and other assets of the state, to secure Kulmiye’s victory. However, the numerous internationalmonitors on the ground unanimously certified that, though the contest was fierce, on the whole the election was quite fair and free.

There is no question that the consummation of the presidential election in Somaliland, the third nation-­‐wide of its type since the rebirth of the country in 1991, has marked its politics distinctly from that of Somalia. In the case of the latter, any hope of a national election –i.e. one-­‐person one vote — is still in the distant future. The reasons for this great divergence include: Somaliland’s relative civic cohesiveness, its working national political institutions, and its professional and able security forces.

In comparison, Somalia continues to be bedeviled by a toxic cocktail of tribalized zones, self-­seeking individualism, fissiparous identity politics, corruption as a way of life among the lumpen elite, and direct and dark financial interventions by foreign countries, particularly from the Middle East and some EU countries in search of compradors. This condition, now entering its third decade, gives the lie to the claim of the existence of an effective government in Somalia. On the contrary, the writ of Mogadishu is not uncontestably enforceable in the whole of the capital, let alone maintaining law and order across the width and breadth of Somalia.

More pointedly, Al-­‐Shabaab forces are resilient and continue to be very active almost everywhere, with particularly violent disruptions of quotidian life in Mogadishu. Such is the condition even after nearly $2 billion of aid, primarily for supporting UNISOM, from the United States alone in the past ten years. In short, the fall out from the total wreckage of the post-­‐colonial Somali state, more than a quarter of a century ago, still debilitatively haunts the people of Somalia. Notwithstanding the grimness of the above, however, it is important to register here this paramount fact: there are still ordinary women and men from Somalia who, everyday quietly, if not heroically, resist the degeneration and, concurrently, dream a new time of resuscitation.

SNATCHING DEFEAT FROM THE JAWS OF VICTORY

But the generalized euphoria that accompanied the electoral success of Kulmiye in Somaliland about a year ago seems to be short lived. More pointedly, that spirit of high expectation, one based on a coast to coast campaign that stressed five urgent public policy priorities- –that is, strengthening civic bonding, stimulating economic growth accompanied by environmental protection, reconstructing educational institutions, addressing the gravity of public health, and reinvigorating international relations –-­‐ is vaporizing. As a result, there is palpable collective descent into what Somalilanders call Amakaag iyo Yaab (i.e. bewilderment and dismay). This worrisome reaction is building up for the following (among others) reasons:

  • President Bihi is yet to concretize in real time the alluring and compact vision that galvanized the majority of the voters – one grounded in broad justice, ethnic and gender equity, and high administrative performance — that was promised to the country.
  • The composition of his cabinet contradicts the repetitively asserted campaign pledge to appoint women and men of the highest caliber. Moreover, the agreed upon postulate of establishing a maximum limit of twenty ministerial portfolios has been breached. In fact, Bihi immediately returned to the old and defective formula of at once exaggerated appointments (32 ministers and deputies) and conspicuous communal imbalance that is exceedingly partial to the kin community in middle of the country (22 vs. 10 and only one full minister who is female). Given the thick rancor surrounding the issue of fairness, it is seems appropriate to heed this wise insight of Michael Ignetieff:

“Interethnic accommodation anywhere depends on equilibrium of forces. An ethnic minority can live in peace with an ethnic majority, as long as that majority does not use its preponderance to turn the institutions of the state into an instrument of ethnic favoritism.”

  • Bihi has admirably and decisively reduced the venal and scandalous use of state revenues, particularly by senior officials. Nevertheless, the effect of the confluence of an absence of economic growth, rising prices, degrading local currency, and severe unemployment rate among the youth is a looming and generalized immiseration. Driven from the rural areas by a succession of droughts and a desiccating landscape, vast numbers of the denizens of Somaliland are moving to the few major urban concentrations and smaller
  • towns. Without reliable sources of livelihood and decent shelter, the majority of the people of Somaliland are increasingly becoming depraved hovel dwellers.
  • Bihi’s administration continues the unsophisticated, ill-­‐planned, poorly staffed, and niggardly funded approach to international affairs. This has been the bane of Somaliland’s global relations ever since the country’s rebirth, twenty-­‐seven and half years ago. Despite the mounting and dizzying changes taking in the neighborhood and farther-­‐afield, then, Somaliland is stuck at a sophomoric level in both understanding the complexities of the search for recognition, as well as taking stock of the strategic shifts that are in-­‐progress.
  • There is no evidence that neither the Ministry of Education nor the Ministry of Public Health has been, thus far, given the supreme attention and reform that each needs so desperately. For, it is a common article of faith in the modern world that these two seminal priorities set the foundation for the production of high quality human capital.
  • The two opposition parties have become feckless and seem incapable, thus far, of offering an analytical and inspiring civic critique. Furthermore, the main opposition, Wadani, which garnered a striking 43 percent of the total vote, is still wailing over the defeat. More than a year later, Wadani has shown no signs that it is a robust national political institution – one that is competent to hold on tightly to its large supporters, restock its vision for the country, win over more citizens to its side, and prepare itself for the competitions ahead.
  • The long, long overdue parliamentary election which have been delayed for over eight years were marked to take place in March 2019. This will not be possible again. There reasons for this include: (a) a highly charged dispute over the tenure of the Electoral Commission such that Wadani believes must be terminated before any new national elections are to mounted, (b) Wadani’s conviction that the majority of the Commission is a disguised and biased members of Kulmiye and, therefore, a new Commission with equal representation from the three parties must be created, and (c) the long-­‐ standing disgruntlement by the kin communities in the western and eastern Somaliland over what they believe to be a severely lopsided and unacceptable distribution of parliamentary seats, one that allots 56 out of the total of 82 seats to the kin community in the geographical center of the country. This impasse, full of murky intrigue, has at least three immediate and critical ramifications. First, the current Parliament, despite unanimity among Somalilanders that it is functionally comatose, will linger on. Second, Somaliland’s acclaimed democratic logos and practice will suffer greater devaluation. This is particularly the case among the members of the international society, particularly the European Union, whose material and moral sympathy for Somaliland has been indispensable. Third, such a situation will further discount President Bihi’s declaration that his leadership will be drastically different from the previous regime in that national elections will be conducted on the appointed month and year. All in all, then, Somalilanders will do well to hear and act on these sagacious and highly relevant testimony from Vico, penned nearly three hundred years ago.

“That body politics is most fortunate, indeed, where the rigorous observance of the law that binds citizens together like the worship of an unknown god; where communal discipline is maintained with no less impartiality and firmness than in an army, where no soldier is allowed to question an order, his only duty being to await commands alertly and execute them.”

Given the preceding and the total dissonance with those who had voted for all parties with high hopes, Somaliland seems to be, as it were, “snatching defeat from the jaws of victory.” Combined, the above concerns, unless attended with potent alacrity and haste, are bound to corrode collective phronesis. Such, in the end, is the critical difference between what Sartre called “seriality” ­‐ passive and thin commonality imposed from without-­ and civic, thick and active republicanism deliberately made within. All in all, then, 2019 is likely to be a year of big stakes and heightened anxieties

 U.S. military says it conducted two airstrikes in central Somalia Wednesday 21-11-18 killing a total of 47 al-Shabab militants.

00300116_d45789ca883534392b34a0369e96e14d_arc614x376_w614_us1.png U.S. military says it conducted two airstrikes in central Somalia Wednesday killing a total of 47 al-Shabab militants.

A statement issued by the U.S. Africa Command Tuesday said the first strike killed 37 militants. Africa Command described the attack as a “planned and deliberate action.”

It says a second strike on the same day killed another 10 Shabab militants. The statement said the airstrikes did not kill or injure civilians.

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Locals told VOA Somali that the strikes targeted al-Shabab vehicles and militias.

In October, another U.S. airstrike in the vicinity of Harardhere killed at least 60 al-Shabab militants.

According to a count by VOA Somali, the U.S. has carried out about 30 airstrikes against al-Shabab this year, killing more than 200 militants.

Al-Shabab, an affiliate of al-Qaida, is trying to overthrow the Somali government and turn Somalia into a strict Islamic state.

U.S. airstrikes have killed numerous al-Shabab leaders over the years, including the group’s former emir Ahmed Godane in September 2014.

37 Alshabaab fighters have been killed and more than 47 others wounded in an airstrike on Saturday 11pmEst 25-11-2018

37 Alshabaab fighters have been killed and more than 47 others wounded in an airstrike on Saturday evening.

According to official Somali National News Agency (SONNA) the attack targeted meeting of the militants in Hargeysa Yarey in the middle Juba region of Somalia at 11PM local time on Saturday.

SONNA said top Al Qaida linked group officials including Daahir Gacmay, Abdirahman Takar, Sayid Dheere, Abdullahi Rabbi and among others were in the meeting during the attack.

No confirmation or denial from US Africa command press department on the attack reportedly carried out by its aircraft.

US drone attacks constantly target alshabaab fighters in Somalia.

Drone strike killed group leader Ahmed Godane on September 2014.

Last week group’s convoy was destroyed by suspected US strike in Galmudug region of Somalia.

The number of casualties or scale of damage is still unclear.

The secret diplomatic relation between isreal and somalilan

Israel and Somaliland have much in common.

Israel faces many adversaries that don’t recognize it or its right to self-determination; Somaliland is also unrecognized as a state by most countries.
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Both share a history with Britain. The British defeated the Ottoman Empire, captured Palestine and later established treaties with the Jewish people in Israel. Somaliland tribal leaders granted the British a protectorate in the territory that would became British Somaliland and subsequently gained independence on June 26, 1960. Israel was first of 34 countries, including the United States, to recognize Somaliland.

Somaliland, which joined South Somalia in a union that lasted until 1991, finds itself politically isolated, in the middle of a hostile region threatened by a sinister and pernicious enemy in the form of encroaching religious extremism. With a population of four million, Somaliland faces hard-line opposition from wider Somalia, with population of 10 million. Israel is perceived as enemy to Arab world with an estimated population of 400 million and economic power of $2.5 trillion a year. Somaliland and Israel face significant opposition and near total rejection of the 22 nations of the Arab world who support the positions of Somalia and Palestinian Arabs, respectively.

Despite overwhelming obstacles, both Somaliland and Israel are beating the odds. Israel is one of the most developed nations in the Middle East and the world, with per capita annual income of $42k and thriving and sophisticated industries. Israeli technology and corporations are pioneers of advanced research and development in the world. Although Israel is situated in semi-desert land that has little potential for agriculture, they have reached 90% food security.

Somaliland, unrecognized by most countries and with limited foreign direct investment, has a flourishing private sector economy, highly advanced telecom, digital economy, peace and stability and democratic processes rare in Africa. It is the only Muslim democracy in the horn of Africa and maintains cordial diplomatic relationships with Western powers and African nations.

Somaliland needs investment, technology and know-how. It has an abundance of resources, such as oil and gas, and strategic positioning that add to its geopolitical prowess. As Israel warms up its relationships with the Arab world and Africa, and Somaliland can a potential ally and friend that can fulfill a strategic Israeli goal – a loyal Muslim ally in the Red Sea region.
Somaliland needs a strong partner that has little to lose in maintaining strong support with Hargeisa, our capital. Alleged Russian interest in establishing a military base in Somaliland, albeit a potential positive development, threatens Somaliland’s close relationship with Washington and the EU, thus Israel stands as a key missing piece in Somaliland puzzle.

The government of Israel has shown interest in restoring the de jure recognition it offered to Somaliland in 1960, considering its role in the geopolitics of the Red Sea and the Horn. According to a local source, Golisnews, Israeli Foreign Ministry spokesman Yigal Palmor has said his government is ready to recognize Somaliland again. Similar sentiment is shown in Somaliland, where influential people, academics, businessmen, civil society organizations and government officials are overwhelmingly in support of a close relationship with Tel Aviv.

The warm attitude toward Israel is not new. M. Haji Ibrahim Egal, the first prime minister of Somaliland, tirelessly solicited Israel’s support, addressing that very issue in a letter to former Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1995.

Given the status of both states and their struggle for statehood and recognition, it is high time Israel and Somaliland renew their diplomatic relationship and mutual cooperation.

The writer is a liberal student and entrepreneur based in Somaliland.

Renewing sanctions measures on Somalia while lifting sanctions on Eritrea, namely the arms embargoes, travel bans

On Wednesday (14 November), the Security Council is expected to adopt a resolution renewing sanctions measures on Somalia while lifting sanctions on Eritrea, namely the arms embargoes, travel bans, asset freezes and targeted sanctions imposed on Eritrea in resolutions 1907 (2009), 2023 (2011), 2060 (2012) and 2111 (2013). Accordingly, the draft resolution states that the committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea will be known as the committee pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia.
The resolution also terminates the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group (SEMG) and establishes the Panel of Experts on Somalia in its stead.
The lifting of sanctions on Eritrea was the culmination of regional political developments that unfolded since Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki signed a peace agreement in Asmara on 9 July, ending a 20-year conflict. Eritrea and Ethiopia signed an Agreement on Peace, Friendship and Comprehensive Cooperation on 16 September, which was welcomed by Council members in a press statement (SC/13516). Ethiopia then pushed in the Council for the lifting of sanctions on Eritrea. Not all issues that led to the imposition of UN sanctions on Eritrea have been entirely resolved, however. In the midst of the rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea, Djibouti transmitted a letter to the Secretary-General on 11 July calling on him, in close collaboration with the Security Council, to use his good offices to facilitate an agreement between the principal parties (that is, Djibouti and Eritrea) on a particular method of dispute settlement, preferably adjudication or arbitration. Resolutions 1862 and 1907 of 2009 called on Eritrea to withdraw its forces to their previous positions from an area disputed with Djibouti (the Ras Doumeira peninsula and adjacent territory), to engage in the peaceful settlement of the border dispute, and to resolve related issues such as unaccounted-for prisoners of war. Resolution 1907 imposes sanctions on Eritrea for obstructing the implementation of resolution 1862 concerning Djibouti. Over the months that followed, Council members started to discuss the conditions under which sanctions would be lifted, taking into account that over the previous four years, the SEMG had not been able to find conclusive evidence that Eritrea was providing support to Al-Shabaab, the main reason the sanctions had been imposed. Council members conveyed to Eritrea that sanctions could be lifted if Eritrea committed to resolving its dispute with Djibouti and, considering that Eritrea has refused to acknowledge and cooperate with the Council’s sanctions regime, if it were to receive the chair of the Sanctions Committee (Ambassador Kairat Umarov of Kazakhstan) for a visit and meet with the coordinator of the SEMG. Several encouraging developments ensued, paving the way for the lifting of sanctions. On 6 September, Eritrea and Djibouti announced the restoration of diplomatic ties, following a trilateral high-level meeting with Ethiopia, and the presidents of the two states met in Jeddah on 17 September. Then, on 25 September, Eritrean Foreign Minister Osman Saleh Mohammed met with Umarov, in his capacity as chair of the sanctions committee, in New York. This was followed by a 5 October meeting between an Eritrean presidential advisor and the SEMG, with the participation of Umarov, also in New York. With respect to Al-Shabaab, Council members received the latest SEMG report in October, which reported that for the fifth year in a row, no conclusive evidence was found that Eritrea was providing support to Al-Shabaab. Furthermore, the report noted that other armed groups acting against Ethiopia with the support of Eritrea have now signed peace agreements with Ethiopia. Heading into the negotiations on the resolution to be voted on tomorrow, there was consensus among Council members that the recent meetings between Eritrean officials, Umarov and the SEMG coordinator were sufficient to demonstrate Eritrea’s cooperation with the Sanctions Committee, and that there had been positive developments on the Eritrea-Djibouti front. Thus, there was a general willingness to work towards terminating sanctions on Eritrea. Nevertheless, some Council members were more supportive than others. Ethiopia, with the support of some members, such as Russia and Sweden, expressed its readiness to end the sanctions. The US and France would have preferred to see further commitment by Eritrea and Djibouti to resolving their dispute, such as a letter to the Council. Taking all of this into account, the draft resolution in blue terminates sanctions measures imposed on Eritrea, while underlining the importance of continuing efforts towards the normalisation of relations between Eritrea and Djibouti for regional peace, stability and reconciliation. In this regard, Council members have been given to understand that Djibouti no longer opposes the lifting of sanctions on Eritrea, provided the Council continues to monitor the situation. The draft urges Eritrea and Djibouti to continue efforts to settle their border dispute peacefully in a manner consistent with international law by conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement, or by any other agreed means of pacific dispute settlement identified in Article 33 of the Charter, and for the parties to engage on the issue of the Djiboutian combatants missing in action. Furthermore, the resolution confirms the Council’s intention to support the two countries’ effort to resolve their differences, requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council by 15 February 2019 and every six months thereafter on this matter, and expresses the Council’s intention to keep normalisation efforts under review. On the reporting requirement, Russia broke silence over a previous draft, taking the view that reporting should be annual rather than every six months. The final draft, however, retains the semi-annual reporting requirement. With the lifting of sanctions on Eritrea, Council members agreed to establish a Panel of Experts on Somalia until 15 December 2019, instead of the SEMG. The Council expresses its intention in the draft resolution to review the panel’s mandate and take appropriate action regarding its extension by 15 November 2019. Council members agreed that the number of experts on the panel should be fewer than the eight members of the SEMG; however, there was disagreement on the precise number. Russia wanted the panel to consist of five experts and broke silence on this issue. Other Council members insisted that the panel number six, and the draft in blue requests the Secretary-General to establish a panel of six experts, in consultation with the Sanctions Committee, drawing, as appropriate, on the expertise of the members of the SEMG. The draft further calls on the panel to include the necessary gender expertise, in line with paragraph 6 of resolution 2242 (2015). The draft resolution further decides that the existing listing criterion under resolution 1844(2008) on engaging in or providing support for acts that threaten the peace, security or stability of Somalia may also include the planning, directing or committing acts involving sexual and gender-based violence. In addition to these changes in the sanctions regime, the draft resolution reaffirms the arms embargo on Somalia, while renewing the partial lifting of the arms embargo on Somali security forces. It also requests the Secretary-General to conduct a technical assessment of the arms embargo, with options and recommendations for improving implementation, by 15 May 2019; renews the authorisation for maritime interdiction to enforce the embargo on illicit arms imports and charcoal exports; and renews the humanitarian exemptions to the sanctions regime. This will be the second resolution that the Council will adopt on Somalia in November. On 6 November, the Council adopted resolution 2442renewing for 13 months the authorisations allowing international naval forces cooperating with Somali authorities to take measures against piracy in the waters off the coast of Somalia. These include operations in Somalia’s territorial waters and related operations on land.

renewing sanctions measures on Somalia while lifting sanctions on Eritrea, namely the arms embargoes, travel bans

Ilhan Omar Arrested in 2013 For Trespassing, Booked At Hennepin County Jail

 

State Rep. Ilhan Omar was arrested in 2013 for trespassing and booked at Hennepin County Jail “to prevent further criminal conduct,” according to a newly uncovered police report.

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The incident took place on January 18, 2013 following an event at the Minneapolis Convention Center featuring former Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud. The Somali president was set to stay the night at the Hotel Ivy, causing large groups of Somalis to follow the presidential convoy to the hotel, including Omar.

According to the police report, hotel staff requested police assistance in clearing the lobby, saying that anyone without a hotel room key was not welcome on the premises and needed to leave immediately. The officer handling the incident said the majority of people who were asked to leave were compliant. However, Omar, when approached, was “argumentative” and refused to leave.

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“As she stood her ground and refused to leave I took hold of her left elbow to escort her from the lobby. Omar then pulled away from me stating, ‘Don’t put your hands on me!’ Others in her group complied and began walking toward the front entry/exit door as I ordered and I managed to coax Omar out with them,” the police report reads.

Ten minutes after the original encounter, the officer reports finding Omar seated in a different area of the lobby. According to the officer’s account, Omar “remained defiant” as he informed her that she would be arrested for trespassing if she didn’t leave.

Since she refused to comply with orders, the officer arrested Omar. The officer reached for Omar’s left arm to get her to stand so she could be handcuffed, but she pulled away. The officer handcuffed her while she stayed seated in the hotel lobby chair.

“Omar was booked at [Hennepin County Jail] as I felt it was likely that she would fail to respond to a citation and she also demonstrated that she was going to continue her criminal behavior,” the officer wrote.

View the police report below:

Ethiopia Recalls its more than 90 long serving Diplomats

Ethiopian more than 90 diplomats who have been appointed in Embassies and Consular offices of finding in different parts of the world and served between four and 25 years.

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Ethiopian Foreign Minister Spokes Person Office announced yesterday that the diplomats are expected to report to the Ministry in two months time.

Parallelly other 130 diplomatic are also assigned to embassies after having the necessary training, according to the Ministry.

As the reallocation of Embassy workers approved by the prime minister, diplomats who are working in different parts of the world will be reshuffled in recent time, said the Ministry spokesperson office.

The new appointment will be based on human resource assignment criteria which is believed to strengthen the professional skills in the ministry.

After the coming of the new leadership, the ministry has announced the reshuffle of Ambassadors.

Currently, Ethiopia maintains 43 embassies abroad as well as 47 consulates. The Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa hosts 115 embassies, and in addition, there are three consulates and one other representation in Ethiopia.

Updated list of Unrecognized countries of 🌎

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UN member states which at least one other UN member state does not recognise Non-UN member states and observer states recognised by at least one UN member state Non-UN member states recognised by other non-UN member states only Non-UN member state not recognised by any state

A number of polities have declared independence and sought diplomatic recognition from the international communityas de jure sovereign states, but have not been universally recognised as such. These entities often have de facto control of their territory. A number of such entities have existed in the past.

There are two traditional doctrines that provide indicia of how a de jure sovereign state comes into being. The declarative theorydefines a state as a person in international law if it meets the following criteria:

  1. a defined territory
  2. a permanent population
  3. a government, and
  4. a capacity to enter into relations with other states.

According to the declarative theory, an entity’s statehood is independent of its recognition by other states. By contrast, the constitutive theory defines a state as a person of international law only if it is recognised as such by other states that are already a member of the international community.[1]

Proto-states often reference either or both doctrines in order to legitimise their claims to statehood. There are, for example, entities which meet the declarative criteria (with de facto partial or complete control over their claimed territory, a government and a permanent population), but whose statehood is not recognised by any other states. Non-recognition is often a result of conflicts with other countries that claim those entities as integral parts of their territory. In other cases, two or more partially recognised states may claim the same territorial area, with each of them de facto in control of a portion of it (as have been the cases of the Republic of China (Taiwan) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and North and South Korea). Entities that are recognised by only a minority of the world’s states usually reference the declarative doctrine to legitimise their claims.

In many situations, international non-recognition is influenced by the presence of a foreign military force in the territory of the contested entity, making the description of the country’s de facto status problematic. The international community can judge this military presence too intrusive, reducing the entity to a puppet state where effective sovereignty is retained by the foreign power. Historical cases in this sense can be seen in Japanese-led Manchukuo or the German-created Slovak Republic and Independent State of Croatia before and during World War II. In the 1996 case Loizidou v. Turkey, the European Court of Human Rights judged Turkey for having exercised authority in the territory of Northern Cyprus.

There are also entities which do not have control over any territory or do not unequivocally meet the declarative criteria for statehood but have been recognised to exist de jure as sovereign entities by at least one other state. Historically this has happened in the case of the Holy See (1870–1929), EstoniaLatvia and Lithuania (during Soviet annexation), and more recently the State of Palestine at the time of its declaration of independence in 1988. The Sovereign Military Order of Malta is currently in this position. See list of governments in exile for unrecognised governments without control over the territory claimed.

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There are 193 United Nations (UN) member states, while both the Holy See and the State of Palestine have observer state status in the United Nations.[2] However, some countries fulfill the declarative criteria, are recognised by the large majority of other states and are members of the United Nations, but are still included in the list here because one or more other states do not recognise their statehood, due to territorial claims or other conflicts.

Some states maintain informal (officially non-diplomatic) relations with states that do not officially recognise them. The Republic of China (Taiwan) is one such state, as it maintains unofficial relations with many other states through its Economic and Cultural Offices, which allow regular consular services. This allows the ROC to have economic relations even with states that do not formally recognise it. A total of 56 states, including Germany,[3] Italy,[4] the United States,[5] and the United Kingdom,[6] maintain some form of unofficial mission in the ROC. Kosovo,[7] the Republic of Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh),[8]the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus,[9]Abkhazia,[10] Transnistria,[10] the Sahrawi Republic,[11] Somaliland,[12] and Palestine[13]also host informal diplomatic missions, and/or maintain special delegations or other informal missions abroad.

Present geopolitical entities by level of recognition

UN member states not recognised by at least one UN member state

Name Declared Status Other claimants Further information References
 South Korea 1948 South Korea, independent since 1948, is not recognised by one UN member, North Korea.  North Koreaclaims to be the sole legitimate government of Korea. Foreign relations, missions (ofto) [14][15]
 Republic of Armenia 1991 Armenia, independent since 1991, is not recognised by one UN member, Pakistan, as Pakistan has a position of supporting Azerbaijansince the Nagorno-Karabakh War. None Foreign relations, missions (ofto) [16][17]
 Republic of Cyprus 1960 The Republic of Cyprus, independent since 1960, is not recognised by one UN member (Turkey) and one UN non-member (Northern Cyprus), due to the ongoing civil dispute over the island.  Northern Cyprusclaims part of the island of Cyprus. Foreign relations, missions (ofto) [18][19][20][21]
 North Korea 1948 North Korea, independent since 1948, is not recognised by three UN members: FranceJapanSouth Korea; and one non-UN member: Taiwan.[22][23][24][original research?][25][26]  South Koreaclaims to be the sole legitimate government of Korea. Foreign relations, missions (ofto) [24][27][28][25][26]
 People’s Republic of China 1949 The People’s Republic of China (PRC), proclaimed in 1949, is the more widely recognised of the two claimant governments of “China”, the other being the Republic of China (ROC, also known as Taiwan). The PRC does not accept diplomatic relations with states that recognise the ROC (16 UN members and the Holy See as of 21 August 2018). Most of these states do not officially recognise the PRC as a state, though some states have established relations with the ROC while stating they do not intend to stop recognising the PRC (Kiribati, Nauru).[29][30] Some states which currently recognise only the PRC have attempted simultaneous recognition and relations with the ROC and the PRC in the past (Liberia, Vanuatu).[31][32][33] According to United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758, the PRC is the only legitimate representative of China to the United Nations.[a]  Republic of Chinaclaims to be the sole legitimate government over all of China under the Constitution of the Republic of China.

Foreign relations, missions (ofto)


PRC’s diplomatic relations dates of establishment

[34]
 State of Israel 1948 Israel, founded in 1948, is not recognised by 31 UN members.  Syriaclaims the Golan Heights.
 Lebanonclaims Shebaa Farms.
 Palestineclaims areas controlled by Israel. Subject to the ongoing Israeli–Palestinian peace process and broader Arab-Israeli peace process.
Foreign relations, missions (ofto)


International recognition

[35][36][37][38]
[39]

UN observer states not recognised by at least one UN member state

Name Declared Status Other claimants Further information References
 State of Palestine 1988 The Palestinian Liberation Organization(PLO) declaredthe State of Palestine in 1988. At the time the Israeli Armed Forces had control of most of the proclaimed territory.[40] It is recognised by 137 UN member states, the Holy See,[41]and the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic.[42]Today the PLC (Palestinian Legislative Council) executes the government functions in all Palestinian territories outside of Israeli military-controlled zones. Prior to the Council’s administration, the Palestinian National Authority(PNA) was established in 1994 according to the Oslo Accords and the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement.[b]Palestine participates in the United Nations as an observer state,[43] and has membership in the Arab League, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperationand UNESCO.[44] It was accorded non-member observer state status at the United Nations by United Nations General Assembly resolution 67/19.  Israeldoes not recognise the state of Palestine and controls areas claimed by Palestine.[b]Subject to the ongoing Israeli–Palestinian peace process+

Africa political map dramatically changed

LIST OF COUNTRIES IN AFRICA

images (7)

African Country Capital City Population
 Algeria Algiers 39,667,203
 Angola Luanda 25,326,755
 Benin Porto-Novo 10,782,365
 Botswana Gaborone 2,176,741
 Burkina Faso Ouagadougou 18,450,347
 Burundi Bujumbura 9,824,320
 Cameroon Yaoundé 21,918,057
 Cape Verde Praia 525,662
 Central African Republic Bangui 4,900,413
 Chad N’Djamena 13,675,741
 Comoros Moroni 783,544
 Democratic Republic of the Congo Kinshasa 77,267,269
 Djibouti Djibouti 961,037
 Egypt Cairo 88,523,985
 Equatorial Guinea Malabo 1,996,227
 Eritrea Asmara 6,895,222
 Ethiopia Addis Ababa 99,391,145
 Gabon Libreville 1,873,230
 Gambia Banjul 2,022,474
 Ghana Accra 27,414,682
 Guinea Conakry 10,935,259
 Guinea-Bissau Bissau 1,788,088
 Ivory Coast Abidjan, Yamoussoukro 23,126,355
 Kenya Nairobi 45,533,204
 Lesotho Maseru 1,908,335
 Liberia Monrovia 4,046,007
 Libya Tripoli 6,278,522
 Madagascar Antananarivo 23,043,955
 Malawi Lilongwe 16,307,685
 Mali Bamako 17,796,125
 Mauritania Nouakchott 3,632,657
 Mauritius Port Louis 1,263,916
 Morocco Rabat 34,380,277
 Mozambique Maputo 28,013,037
 Namibia Windhoek 2,281,238
 Niger Niamey 18,880,785
 Nigeria Abuja 182,202,652
 Republic of the Congo Brazzaville 4,706,257
 Rwanda Kigali 11,324,426
 São Tomé and Príncipe São Tomé 194,000
 Senegal Dakar 14,150,852
 Seychelles Victoria 970,457
 Sierra Leone Freetown 6,513,357
 Somalia

Somaliland

Mogadishu

Hargeisa

9,972,148

5,320,123

 South Africa Bloemfontein, Cape Town, Pretoria 5,495,724
 South Sudan Juba 12,519,321
 Sudan Khartoum 40,235,712
 Swaziland Mbabane 1,119,524
 Tanzania Dodoma 51,046,045
 Togo Lomé 7,065,418
 Tunisia Tunis 11,118,759
 Uganda Kampala 37,102,024
 Zambia Lusaka 15,474,644
 Zimbabwe Harare 13,503,963
Total 1,125,307,147
images (6)
Author: Shakir Essa

The extraordinary success story, this story can change your mind

It was no ordinary test for Mubarik Mohamoud. As the first student from the Abaarso School of Science and Technology to be accepted into an American school, Mubarik could create untold opportunities for his schoolmates with a successful transition to Worcester Academy.

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On the other hand, if he stumbled, his peers’ hopes might be dashed.

Jonathan Starr, a former hedge fund manager who started Abaarso eight years ago in the breakaway African republic of Somaliland, chuckles as he recalls his demanding expectations for Mubarik. When he learned that his prize student was worried “the entire future is on his shoulders,” he responded, “Good! He’s been listening.”

Starr, who lives in Westborough with his wife and baby daughter, spent four years in Somaliland building a high school campus out of the unforgiving rubble on the outskirts of the capital city, Hargeisa. He has just published a book, “It Takes a School: The Extraordinary Story of an American School in the World’s No. 1 Failed State,” about his rash decision to bring a rigorous education to the former region of Somalia, and the remarkable group of teachers and students who brought that vision to reality.

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By his early 30s, Starr had amassed significant wealth and achievement as a systems savant for Fidelity Investments and later with his own hedge fund, Cambridge-based Flagg Street Capital. But he still felt a nagging desire to do something meaningful with his life.

While working in finance, he volunteered as a Boys and Girls Club basketball coach. After leading a winning season with an underskilled team from the suburbs, he jumped to another club closer to Boston, where the players were more talented. But they were growing up in dysfunction.

“The kids lived such chaotic lives; we had no shot,” Starr says.

It was a hard-earned lesson: Create a positive, pervasive culture, and success would follow. But how and where?

A movie buff, he was drawn to inspirational classroom films like “Stand and Deliver,” the 1988 story of East Los Angeles math teacher Jaime Escalante. And for some time, he writes in his book, he had harbored an idea “to start a school for really talented kids who have great potential that will otherwise go wasted.’’

He was aware of the challenges of students in Somaliland because he has an aunt who married a man from there. Growing up, he loved playing Somali card games on family vacations with his beloved Uncle Billeh, who worked for the United Nations. In 2008, it all came together.

When Starr first set out to find a location for his project, he had no experience building a school — or even teaching, for that matter. He would become the school’s first headmaster, turning over the reins to his assistant in 2015. What he did have, besides determination, was money: He initially put forth $500,000 and to date he’s funneled nearly twice that into the school.

When he first arrived in Somaliland, almost all of the republic’s schools had been destroyed or run into the ground by the Somali civil war. Covering grades 7-12, Abaarso, named for the town the school is in, now serves 212 students on its walled, multibuilding campus. Acceptance is competitive. The staff has grown to about two dozen teachers who come from various corners of the world. They each wear several hats and earn a nominal salary — about $3,000 for the school year. They do it for one reason, Starr says — pride in a job well done.

And there is much to be proud of. To date, Abaarso has placed more than 80 students in international boarding schools or colleges.

Mubarik graduated from Worcester Academy — Starr’s alma mater — in 2013. This spring, after majoring in electrical engineering and computer science, he’ll graduate from M.I.T. Having specialized in autonomous robotics, he’d like to help engineer driverless cars. It’s an astounding trajectory for a boy who grew up in a world so rural, he mistook the first motor vehicles he saw to be some kind of bizarre domesticated animal.

“I do not feel exceptional,” says Mubarik, “but I do feel lucky.”

For Starr, his belief in the young people of Somaliland was simply a practical matter.

“If you get the kids to see it’s actually worth investing in their future,” he says, “then they’ll do well.”

Because Somaliland is considered an autonomous region of Somalia, the Trump administration’s recent ban on travel from seven mostly Muslim nations — including Somalia — has plunged the Abaarso community into a spiral of uncertainty.

“It definitely makes me nervous,” says Mubarik, speaking on the phone recently during a break in his studies. “But I am hopeful.”

Starr frets that the travel ban could mean Abaarso will have to stop sending its best students to America for college. If he could show Mubarik’s progress to the president and his administration, he says — in fact, the school’s story is scheduled to be featured in an upcoming “60 Minutes” segment — he believes they would recognize the need to make exemptions.

Though he has returned to Massachusetts to start his own family, Starr still spends several weeks each school year at Abaarso. He continues to work full time, and then some, on behalf of the school, planning, fund-raising, and advocating for its students at American colleges and boarding schools.

Besides Mubarik, four other students from Abaarso’s inaugural year are set to graduate from American universities this spring. One of them, an intensely goal-oriented young woman named Nimo Ismail, is completing her studies at Oberlin College.

“She’s known I want her to be the attorney general of Somaliland for so long,” says Starr.

At least two of the graduating seniors plan to return to Abaarso to join the faculty. For Starr, that’s a milestone he’s been eagerly awaiting.

Mubarik may stay in the United States to work toward his master’s degree, or he might go back to help introduce more Somaliland kids to computers. Either way, Starr wants all the students his school sends overseas to become the future of their homeland.

“Here he can be great,” he says. “There, he can be king.”

You can buy at #Amazon the completed story book

Check this out: It Takes a School: The Extraordinary Success Story That Is Chang… https://www.amazon.com/dp/B01F1YMKF2/ref=cm_sw_r_sms_awdo_t1_tWfTBbW4KJTAM

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