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2 Canadian women freed from Somaliland prison say they endured extreme abuse Maymona Abdi, 28, and Karima Watts, 24, arrested in January, released in April

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Two Canadian women freed from a prison in Somaliland say they endured extreme abuse “bordering on torture” while they were detained for two months overseas.
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Maymona Abdi, 28, and Karima Watts, 24, originally from Ottawa, arrived at Toronto’s Pearson International Airport on Sunday. They were arrested by police on Jan. 19 for allegedly drinking alcohol in the Somaliland city of Hargeisa. They were held without trial and released on April 23.
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Consuming alcohol is illegal in Somaliland, a self-declared republic still internationally considered to be part of Somalia. The women disputed the charge, but were detained at the Koodbuur Station Women’s Prison in Hargeisa.
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Canadian women released from jail in Somaliland
“I feel a lot of relief. It’s been really hard,” Abdi told reporters at the airport shortly after their arrival. “I’m super tired and anxious.”
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Maymona Abdi
Maymona Abdi spent more than two months in jail in Somaliland (CBC)
Abdi said she thinks they were released because of media coverage of their plight. She said Canadian consular officials did not help them as much as they needed.

According to their lawyer, Mubarik Mohamoud Abdi, the women signed confessions under duress, hoping to avoid being detained. They were sentenced to 2½ months in jail and 40 lashes. He said the prosecution in the case did not prove before the court that the women drank alcohol.
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‘Name a place where it isn’t dangerous to be us’
In a prepared statement that she read aloud, Abdi said people have asked them why they went somewhere as dangerous as Somaliland. She said the two felt an obligation to help women facing violence.

“Name a place where it isn’t dangerous to be us. Where is it safe to be a woman? In reality, it is women on the ground, who look like us, who are sacrificing everything.”

Her family retains property in Somaliland, according to Abdi’s mother Fahima Hassan.
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According to Jason Jeremias, a human rights activist based in New York City, Abdi was working to intervene in the protection of women at extreme risk of gender-based violence, but they did not go as official representatives of a non-governmental organization.

Karima Watts
Karima Watts stands in Toronto’s Pearson International Airport on Sunday. (CBC)
Abdi said she and Watts were subjected to extreme emotional and psychological abuse as well as “physical retaliation” in prison. She said they were denied medical aid, legal counsel and, at times, food and water.

According to international human rights conventions, that denial constitutes torture, she said.

“We burdened our struggle in silence,” she said. “For two months, while we were being detained, the world had no clue where we were and what we were being subjected to.”

Silence enables violence, she added. “We will stand up for each other as women wherever we face violence,” she said.

Jeremias, who is connected to the organization the Price of Silence, spoke up on their behalf, drawing attention to their case, she said.

Don’t give up fight for human rights, she says
Abdi, whose sister is in Toronto, said she plans to go to the hospital to be assessed. She said they also have to decide where they are going to live.

She added she would like Canadians not to give up the fight for human rights and to remember many people around the world are suffering in silence.
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“I want them to know, there’s people out there that go through things but nobody really knows,” she said. “Be aware of it. Open your eyes.”

Maymona Abdi and Karima Watts
Watts, left, and Abdi take a break after Abdi spoke to the media in Toronto. (CBC)
Shirley Gillett, project co-ordinator of I Do! Project in Toronto, said she believes the charge of consuming alcohol was trumped up. The project works with survivors of forced marriage and those at risk of forced marriage.
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Gillett said Abdi, who lived in Vancouver before heading overseas, has done work with the project. She said Abdi contacted her after she had arrived in Somaliland.

“They’ve been through a lot of stress. They’re exhausted as well. They were living in conditions that were deplorable, to say the least,” Gillett said.

“We’re just relieved that they’re home. We’re just looking to getting them to good health, supporting them in any way they can.”

Avoid all travel to Somalia, Ottawa says
In a statement earlier, Hassan had said: “Maymona and Karima were born and grew up in Ottawa, Canada, as best friends. When Karima’s mother died, she became our daughter.”

Canadians are urged to avoid all travel to Somalia, according to the Canadian government in a travel advisory that was last updated on April 25.
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“If you are currently in Somalia despite this advisory, you should leave immediately,” the travel advisory reads.

“The security situation in Somalia is extremely volatile and the threat of domestic terrorism is high, particularly in south-central Somalia and in the capital, Mogadishu.”
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Shirley Gillett
Shirley Gillett, project co-ordinator of the I Do! Project in Toronto, says she believes the charges were trumped up. (CBC)

Reporter: Shakir Essa

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Top ten 10 poorest countries in the world

GDP per capita is often considered an indicator of the standard of living of a given country, as it reflects the average wealth of each person residing in a country. It is therefore the standard method used to compare how poor or wealthy countries are in relation to each other. With 2018 coming to a close, we decided to take a look at our forecasts for GDP per capita from 2019 to 2023 for the 127 countries we cover to get an idea of what countries are the poorest currently and which will be making a leap toward becoming wealthier in the coming years. The projections used in this study are Consensus Forecasts based on the individual forecasts of over 1000 world renowned investment banks, economic think tanks and professional economic forecasting firms.

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Click image to view larger version – See the full list below

As one might imagine those closest to the top of the list are mostly emerging markets and least developed countries of which the majority are from Sub-Saharan Africa. Similar to our ranking for the most miserable economies, this is one of those lists where the “winners” aren’t really winners; being as far from the top of the list as possible is a good thing.

Many of the poorest nations in the world are places where issues such as authoritarian regimes, political turmoil, weak financial institutions, inadequate infrastructure and corruption deter foreign investment despite the fact that many of them are immensely rich in natural resources and have a young, growing population. In our list of the top 10, five are landlocked, which means they have no direct access to maritime trade and another one is in the midst of a civil war, which helps to explain why some of them are currently not in the best of shape.

Despite how grim that may sound, these countries stand to benefit the most in the coming years as emerging markets will become vitally important to the global economy. Although per capita GDP will still be the highest in the developed world by 2023, the fastest growth in GDP per capita will indeed come from many of the world’s poorest economies currently. According to our forecasts, the highest per capita growth from 2017–2023 will be in Mongolia with an 89% increase in that time span, followed by Myanmar, Egypt, Serbia and Bangladesh with 83%, 80%, 79%, and 67% growth in per capita GDP, respectively.

With that said, let’s have a look at the poorest countries in the world according to the FocusEconomics Consensus Forecast for 2019 nominal GDP per capita.

1. Democratic Republic of Congo
2017 GDP per Capita: USD 439

2019 GDP per Capita (projected): USD 475

2023 GDP per Capita (projected): USD 551

Although the DRC has abundant natural resources, unfortunately with a projected 2019 GDP per capita of USD 475, the country is in the unenviably position of being the poorest country in the world. There has been severe political unrest in recent years, as calls for President Joseph Kabila, who took power after the assassination of his father in 2001, reached a fever pitch in 2018. Kabila was reelected in 2011 in a controversial election and had since postponed elections several times. Finally in August, Kabila declared that he would not seek re-election and named a successor candidate. The next presidential election has been slated for 23 December and opposition parties selected well-known businessman and veteran legislator, Martin Fayulu, as the unity candidate on 11 November following lengthy talks in Geneva. Fayulu has been one of the fiercest critics of President Joseph Kabila’s tight grip on power. While strong activity in the extractive sectors has supported firm growth, the long-delayed elections have led to a tense business environment and a slowdown in overall activity. Moreover, Katanga Mining (a subsidiary of Glencore) announced a temporary halt to cobalt production at its Kamoto mine, after high levels of uranium were discovered.

Strong demand for key export commodities, including copper and cobalt, is expected to drive growth next year. Moreover, a sharp decline in inflation should buoy domestic demand. Political risks, however, darken the outlook. FocusEconomics analysts have thus far priced-in a peaceful transition of power—which would mark the first since independence in 1960—projecting growth of 3.7% in 2019 and 4.3% in 2020.

2. Mozambique
2017 GDP per Capita: USD 429

2019 GDP per Capita (projected): USD 502

2023 GDP per Capita (projected): USD 648

The second poorest country in the world is Mozambique with a forecasted GDP per capita of USD 502 for 2019. The former Portuguese colony has high hopes of transforming its economy based on prospects of abundant natural gas fields discovered in 2011. The country recently took an important step toward said transformation with the approval of a USD 20 billion Anadarko liquified natural gas plant in early-2018, which envisages exploiting the country’s vast deposits of natural gas.

Economic growth is expected to accelerate this year on the back of higher prices for natural gas. FocusEconomics panelists see growth of 3.5% in 2018 and 4.1% in 2019.

3. Uganda
2017 GDP per Capita: USD 726

2019 GDP per Capita (projected): USD 759

2023 GDP per Capita (projected): USD 959

Uganda finds itself in third place on the list with a 2019 projected GDP per capita of USD 759. Although this represents a large leap from the level of the first two on the list, Uganda is a bit of a strange case. Following the 1986 armed conflict, the ruling political party National Resistance Movement (NRM), enacted a series of structural reforms and investments that led to a period of significant economic growth and poverty reduction all the way up to 2010. In the last five years or so, economic growth has slowed and consequently so has the pace of poverty reduction. There are a variety of factors that have brought on the slowdown, however, it has been attributed mostly to adverse weather, private sector credit constraints, the poor execution of public sector projects and unrest in their neighbor South Sudan, which has flooded the country with refugees fleeing the country and subdued exports. According to the World Bank, if Foreign Direct Investment accelerates, the banking system stabilizes, and budgeted, capital spending is executed without delays, the economy may start to pick up once again, helping to reduce poverty.

Luckily for Uganda, it appears the FDI is indeed improving according to the latest confiremd data, expanding by double digits in 2017, which bodes well for the economy and poverty reduction in the near future. The downside risk to the outlook is the weakness in the financial system, particularly the low level of credit in the private sector and the high cost of small loans. FocusEconomics panelists see growth of 5.9% in 2019 and 6.1% in 2020.

4. Tajikistan
2017 GDP per Capita: USD 777

2019 GDP per Capita (projected): USD 861

2023 GDP per Capita (projected): USD 1159

Tajikistan is number four on the list of poorest countries with a projected 2019 GDP per capita of USD 861. Tajikistan gained independence after the fall of the Soviet Union, however, a civil war broke out shortly after, which lasted five years until 1997. Since then, political stability and foreign aid have allowed the country’s economy to grow, reducing poverty rather remarkably. According the World Bank, poverty fell from over 83% to 47% between 2000 and 2009 and fell further from 37% to 30% between 2012 and 2016. Since then, poverty reduction, has regrettably stagnated, however, it is projected to fall from 30% to 25% by 2019 as growth picks up.

The economy, which is highly reliant on remittances, is expected to grow strongly in again 2019. Improving labor market dynamics, and a continued robust inflow of remittances supported by Russia’s ongoing economic recovery, should buoy private consumption. Headwinds to the growth outlook include a less supportive external environment owing to tighter global financial conditions and the escalating tit-for-tat trade war. The economy is seen growing 5.7% in 2019 and 5.4% in 2020.

5. Yemen
2016 GDP per Capita: USD 762

2019 GDP per Capita (projected): USD 913

2023 GDP per Capita (projected): USD 1079

Yemen is in the midst of massive civil war that has caused a catastrophic humanitarian crisis, which goes a long way to explaining the country’s place on this list of the poorest countries in the world. Yemen is forecast to have a GDP per capita of USD 913 in 2019. Basic services across the country are on the verge of collapse, as half of the population is currently living in areas directly affected by the conflict and millions of Yemenis have been forcibly displaced.

Yemen is also facing the worst famine in a century, according to the United Nations, with 14 million people at risk of starvation. After peace talks failed to get off the ground in September, fighting only intensified. In recent weeks, the unofficial exchange rate has come under pressure despite a USD 200 million cash injection from Saudi Arabia into Yemen’s Central Bank in October, while Yeminis around the country have protested for better living conditions.

Following three-and-a-half years of civil war, the economy is expected to return to growth for the first time in six years in 2019; albeit thanks in part to a miserably-low base effect. FocusEconomics expects the economy to expand 5.3% in 2019 and 7.6% in 2020.

6. Haiti
2017 GDP per Capita: USD 776

2019 GDP per Capita (projected): USD 923

2023 GDP per Capita (projected): USD 993

Haiti is number six on the list with an expected GDP per capita of USD 923. Haiti is extremely vulnerable to extreme weather and natural disasters with 90% of the country’s population at risk according to the World Bank. These natural disasters batter the country in more ways than one, including the economy. The 2010 earthquake for example did damage equivalent to 32% of the country’s GDP.

Although there is some positive sentiment over Haiti’s political situation, as new president Jovenel Moïse took office in February of last year and the new parliament and cabinet were ratified later in the year, which should allow the country to accelerate reforms and move public programs forward to create a more sustainable development for all Haitians, the country remains the poorest in the Americas. More than 6 million out of 10.4 million Haitians live under the national poverty line of USD 2.41 per day and over 2.5 million live under the national extreme poverty line of USD 1.23 per day according to the latest household survey (ECVMAS 2012). As far as income equality goes, it is also one of the most unequal, with a Gini coefficient of 0.59 as of 2012.

While the economy started 2017 on a solid footing, economic activity has decelerated since, mostly due to the negative impact of Hurricanes Harvey and Irma. Furthermore, the U.S. administration’s decision to scrap Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Haitians as of July 2019 threatens all-important remittance inflows, which account for around 34% of the country’s GDP. As a result of this decision, around 60,000 Haitians currently living in the U.S. could be forced to return to Haiti.

Growth should accelerate in 2019, though the country’s prospects remain hampered by rampant corruption and political instability. Growth is projected to come in at 2.7% in 2019 and 2.7% again in 2020.

7. Ethiopia
2016 GDP per Capita: USD 884

2019 GDP per Capita (projected): USD 1122

2023 GDP per Capita (projected): USD 1508

Back to Africa now with number seven on the list, Ethiopia is located in the Horn of Africa, which gives it a great strategic jumping off point, as it is close to the Middle East and its markets. Although it is technically landlocked, it’s tiny bordering neighbor, Djibouti acts as its main port. Ethiopia has grown rapidly since the turn of the century, and is currently the fastest growing country in Africa, although extremely poor as evidenced by its projected 2019 GDP per capita of just USD 1122.

Along with Ethiopia’s rapid economic growth came significant reductions in poverty with over 55% of Ethiopians living in extreme poverty in 2000 dropping to 33.5% in 2011, according to the World Bank. To sustain its economic growth and poverty reduction, good governance is needed, however, significant public unrest has taken hold in Ethiopia of late over the country’s authoritarian regime.

In a bid to cool mass unrest and open the way for economic reforms, Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn submitted his resignation on 15 February. In October, parliament approved Sahle-Work Zewde to become the country’s first female president—a sign of political openness from Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. Growth should remain robust in FY 2018, although is likely to slow somewhat as the government restrains public investment growth to limit imports. That said, an improving business environment following market-friendly economic reforms could propel stronger activity in the private sector. FocusEconomics sees the economy growing 8.2% in FY 2018 and 7.6% in FY 2019.

8. Tanzania
2017 GDP per Capita: USD 1037

2019 GDP per Capita (projected): USD 1159

2023 GDP per Capita (projected): USD 1502

Number eight on the list of poorest economies is Tanzania with an expected USD 1159 GDP per capita for 2019. Tanzania’s economy has been very consistent over the last decade averaging between 6 and 7% growth every year. According to the World Bank, the poverty rate has also steadily declined, however, the absolute number of people living in poverty has not due to the high growth rate of its population over that time.

Economic prospects for Tanzania depend on infrastructure investment, improving the business environment, increasing agricultural productivity, amongst others and growth prospects for next year remain strong. The economy should continue to expand solidly, supported by sustained infrastructure spending and growth within the services sector on the back of growing tourist inflows. FocusEconomics expects GDP to expand 6.5% in 2019, which is unchanged from last month’s forecast, and 6.4% in 2020.

9. Kyrgyzstan
2017 GDP per Capita: USD 1203

2019 GDP per Capita (projected): USD 1266

2023 GDP per Capita (projected): USD 1488

Kyrgyzstan is ninth on the list with an expected 2019 GDP per capita of USD 1266. A landlocked, largely mountainous country with just over 6 million inhabitants, the Kyrgyz Republic recently adopted a parliamentary system in 2011. Having experienced considerable political and social instability with weak governance and high corruption since gaining independence in 1991, the country’s current democracy is a far cry from those days. Nonetheless corruption is still pervasive in the public sector, which constrain the country’s economic growth potential.

The Kyrgyz economy is also vulnerable to external shocks due to its overreliance on its massive gold mine, Kumtor, which accounts for about 10% of GDP, as well as remittances, which amount to about 30% of GDP.

Growing gold production in September at the all-important Kumtor mine powered the rebound in economic activity recorded in the January–September period, when GDP increased slightly in annual terms, from the small contraction recorded in January–August. That said, cumulative mining output in January–September was still much lower than in the same period last year, which translated into falling exports. On the other hand, during the same time span, sustained wage increases and rising remittances led to a solid expansion in retail sales while both capital investment and construction increased strongly.

GDP growth is set to accelerate next year, as production at the Kumtor gold mine increases, driving output growth in the industrial sector. Solid consumer spending, fueled by healthy wage growth and higher remittances from Russia, will also underpin the expansion. A possible cooling in economic activity in Russia due to U.S. sanctions, however, cloud the outlook. FocusEconomics projects GDP growth of 4.3% in 2019 and 4.5% in 2020.

10. Uzbekistan
2017 GDP per Capita: USD 1514

2019 GDP per Capita (projected): USD 1350

2023 GDP per Capita (projected): USD 2351

Uzbekistan is last on the list of poorest countries according to 2019 GDP per capita, which is forecast to come in at USD 1350. The country’s economic growth was fast between 2004 and 2016, lifting significant portions of the country out of poverty. A country rich in commodities, Uzbekistan was aided by high commodities prices and increased exports of gas, gold and copper, which generated state revenues that financed large increases in investment and wages that bolstered private consumption.

Unfortunately, in the period between 2013 and 2016, commodities prices came crashing down along with the weak performance of Russia and China, key trade partners, adversely affected the economy. Despite the external environment weakening, the government’s countercyclical fiscal and monetary policies allowed growth to slow only slightly, however, poverty reduction has largely stagnated.

In February of 2017, the government began implementing its Strategy of Actions for the Development of Uzbekistan for 2017-2021, which among other things included measures to liberalize its economy. One measure was implemented in September of 2017, which linked the official exchange rate with the curb market rate and established a framework to allow it to flow.

Unfortunately, the economy moderated sharply in 2017 to 5.3% from 2016’s 7.8%, the slowest print since 2003. The moderation partly reflected the impact of the currency devaluation, which had caused inflation to spike and real disposable income to drop. It also underscored the short-lived impact that many market-friendly reforms pushed ahead by the government to attract foreign investment are having on the economy.

The economy grew 5.2% annually in the January–September 2018 period, driven by a strong services sector and solid industrial output. Industrial activity was propped up by soaring mining and quarrying production, largely thanks to a booming natural gas sector. In addition, construction activity expanded robustly in the same period, supported by buoyant demand for real estate amid easing inflationary pressures. On 19 October, authorities began preparatory work on the country’s first nuclear plant, estimated to cost USD 11 billion and largely financed by Russia, in a bid to further strengthen Uzbekistan’s energy sector. The government has also signed multibillion-dollar economic and investment deals with Russia and the U.S. as the country continues its pro-liberal economic policy push.

In 2019, growth should remain solid on the back of sustained government spending, healthy capital investment and a growing inflow of remittances from Russia. FocusEconomics expects the economy to expand 5.1% in 2019, down 0.4 percentage points from last month’s forecast, and 5.5% in 2020.

You can see the entire list below of our projections for GDP per capita for 2018 below. If you’d like to get more historical data, Consensus Forecasts, charts, graphs and written analysis from our team of economists, download a free sample report by clicking on the button below the table.

GDP Per Capita 2019-2023
2019 Rank Country GDP per Capita 2019 (projected) GDP per Capita 2017 (actual) 2017 Rank GDP per Capita 2023 (projected) 2023 Rank
1 DRC 475.3217 438.5256 2 551.3249 1
2 Mozambique 501.9192 429.3636 1 647.641 2
3 Uganda 759.0817 725.9486 3 959.4522 3
4 Tajikistan 861.2937 777.0268 5 1158.827 6
5 Yemen 912.5141 – N/A 1079.137 5
6 Haiti 922.7217 775.8355 4 992.7961 4
7 Ethiopia 1122.567 – N/A 1508.321 9
8 Tanzania 1159.105 1037.079 6 1502.31 8
9 Kyrgyzstan 1266.064 1203.071 7 1487.614 7
10 Uzbekistan 1350.473 1513.999 10 2350.817 14
11 Zambia 1479.781 1566.378 13 1858.185 10
12 Pakistan 1495.477 1546.844 12 1869.015 11
13 Myanmar 1533.067 1278.07 8 2337.462 13
14 Cambodia 1627.842 1383.751 9 2194.383 12
15 Bangladesh 1774.44 1521.366 11 2547.109 18
16 CDI 1899.69 1618.134 14 2526.718 17
17 Kenya 1960.507 1691.498 15 2357.122 15
18 Nicaragua 2151.084 2220.543 19 2388.447 16
19 India 2171.269 1979.313 16 – N/A
20 Nigeria 2318.455 1994.661 17 2988.712 19
21 Ghana 2434.003 2061.11 18 3278.356 21
22 Vietnam 2749.925 2354.901 20 3750.412 22
23 Laos 2898.278 2522.904 22 3925.37 24
24 Honduras 2909.249 2773.835 25 3202.053 20
25 Egypt 2924.286 2471.783 21 4439.591 30
26 Ukraine 3033.515 2685.161 23 4237.628 28
27 Angola 3041.152 4388.521 40 4274.436 29
28 Philippines 3306.841 2989.068 26 4560.859 31
29 Moldova 3347.066 2761.133 24 3922.999 23
30 Tunisia 3502.351 3479.192 29 4155.141 26
31 Morocco 3513.398 3159.52 27 4120.344 25
32 Bolivia 3727.982 3388.005 28 4228.401 27
33 Venezuela 3887.217 – N/A – N/A
34 Indonesia 4042.662 3875.781 32 5480.01 37
35 El Salvador 4172.125 3894.715 33 4782.359 32
36 SriLanka 4264.391 4071.251 36 5565.878 38
37 Algeria 4281.844 4036.28 35 5369.218 34
38 Georgia 4322.538 4265.342 39 5765.187 42
39 Armenia 4462.305 3862.116 31 5681.698 41
40 Azerbaijan 4505.525 4148.86 37 5449.05 36
41 Jordan 4554.322 4195.882 38 5436.38 35
42 Kosovo 4669.263 4026.13 34 6298.403 43
43 Mongolia 4694.103 3639.977 30 6886.963 45
44 Guatemala 4769.698 4466.347 41 5613.315 39
45 Belize 4850.095 4825.427 43 5025.607 33
46 Iraq 5081.196 4920.48 44 5672.477 40
47 Jamaica 5455.045 5198.3 45 6603.454 44
48 Albania 5532.769 4644.693 42 7033.495 47
49 Iran 5645.365 5634.898 49 7852.415 51
50 Paraguay 6050.501 5633.191 48 7166.749 48
51 Bosnia 6130.693 5309.657 46 8152.124 53
52 South Africa 6135.719 6281.276 53 7491.503 49
53 Belarus 6169.273 5707.975 50 7616.448 50
54 Ecuador 6210.746 6216.598 52 6919.949 46
55 Macedonia 6270.104 5437.174 47 8274.915 55
56 Colombia 6886.258 6377.405 54 8262.014 54
57 Turkmenistan 7203.68 6642.032 56 8020.402 52
58 Peru 7238.793 6748.979 57 9126.309 56
59 Thailand 7572.41 6590.926 55 9494.643 57
60 Serbia 7772.239 5904.748 51 10597.87 60
61 Turkey 8060.201 10541.78 67 11338.95 62
62 Dominican Republic 8245.759 7472.295 58 9693.61 58
63 Botswana 8403.47 7657.871 59 10499.33 59
64 Montenegro 9127.597 7796.785 60 11935.33 64
65 Brazil 9180.12 9895.964 66 11365.09 63
66 Kazakhstan 9346.117 8585.308 62 12053.76 65
67 Argentina 9519.177 14605.17 75 10853.51 61
68 Bulgaria 10008.19 8300 61 13491.55 68
69 China 10148.53 8805.975 63 14442.21 69
70 Mexico 10357.13 9325.097 64 12732.19 66
71 Russia 10640.84 10957.71 69 13289.46 67
72 Malaysia 11354.87 9814.508 65 14714.68 71
73 Costa Rica 12095.84 11626.27 71 14623.26 70
74 Romania 12811.64 10843.51 68 17476.31 73
75 Lebanon 12895.13 11495.45 70 15658.22 72
76 Croatia 15777.19 13814.83 72 20657.06 76
77 Poland 16460.36 13825.27 73 22526.56 81
78 Panama 16568.68 15198.58 77 20195.35 75
79 Chile 16590.26 15117.77 76 20852.7 77
80 Hungary 16660.19 14349.87 74 22278.07 79
81 Uruguay 16907.26 17104.49 81 22389.87 80
82 Oman 17563.99 17102.49 80 18725.36 74
83 Trinidad 17827.89 16146.82 79 21583.47 78
84 Latvia 18610.53 15571.79 78 24869.22 83
85 Lithuania 20364.45 18513.27 83 28160.73 86
86 Greece 20886.22 18638.56 84 25929.76 84
87 Slovakia 20987.53 17639.72 82 27155.12 85
88 Saudi Arabia 22278.18 21095.4 87 24846.53 82
89 Estonia 24123.96 20275.08 85 32358.3 91
90 Portugal 24205.31 21294.77 88 30030.2 88
91 CzechRepublic 24968.04 20492.96 86 33081.46 92
92 Taiwan 25949.99 24382.5 91 31246.56 89
93 Bahrain 26026.56 24237.5 90 29461.96 87
94 Slovenia 27634.46 23494.68 89 35535.75 94
95 Kuwait 28140.95 27129.24 93 31892.92 90
96 Cyprus 29367.9 26081.87 92 36237.79 95
97 Brunei 30294.58 28276.27 95 34070.92 93
98 Malta 31854.31 27326.09 94 41280.48 99
99 Korea 32660.66 29745.07 97 39784.39 96
100 Spain 32672.64 28393.94 96 40600.76 97
101 PuertoRico 32682.34 31229.57 98 40601.42 98
102 Italy 35580.39 32354.72 99 42000.28 100
103 UAE 38756.57 37728.2 100 43211.3 101
104 NewZealand 40429.89 41536.53 104 47487.16 102
105 Japan 41498.26 38175.17 101 47640.65 103
106 Israel 42520.91 41840.48 105 50825.49 104
107 UnitedKingdom 44617.91 39901.32 103 53548.03 105
108 France 44857.76 39889.51 102 53625.24 106
109 Belgium 48540.49 44112.05 106 58460.56 108
110 Canada 48651.49 45080.67 107 55542.25 107
111 HongKong 50164.08 46064.78 109 59466.59 109
112 Germany 50815.83 45275.83 108 62229.67 110
113 Finland 51647.6 46393.24 110 62589.18 111
114 Austria 53807.81 47860.47 111 64806.86 112
115 Netherlands 55453.01 48485.41 112 67414.58 113
116 Sweden 56305.87 52958.5 113 75053.39 118
117 Australia 57171.87 55680.85 114 67846.35 114
118 Singapore 62004.74 57494.65 116 73585.83 115
119 Denmark 62204.32 57359.54 115 74401.73 117
120 Qatar 64788.74 60693.81 118 77778.58 119
121 USA 65132.9 59792.04 117 73856.17 116
122 Iceland 78031.79 73477.01 120 95854.63 120
123 Ireland 79773.38

: Afrika times: Shakir Essa

Saudi Arabia with UAE and Turkey with Qatar Are Playing a Dangerous Game in the Horn of Africa

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The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has been expanding its role in the Horn of Africa. Along with other Gulf powers, it is broadening its ties to the region. Strategic rivalries, including those within the Gulf Cooperation Council pitting the UAE and Saudi Arabia against Qatar, often motivate Gulf powers’ increasing influence.

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Why does it matter? The influence of, and competition among, Gulf states could reshape Horn geopolitics. Gulf leaders can nudge their African counterparts toward peace; both the UAE and Saudi Arabia helped along the recent Eritrea-Ethiopia rapprochement. But rivalries among Gulf powers can also sow instability, as their spillover into Somalia has done.

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What should be done? The UAE, whose Horn presence is particularly pronounced, should build on its successful Eritrea-Ethiopia diplomacy. It should continue backing Eritrean-Ethiopian peace, encouraging both parties to fulfil their commitments. Abu Dhabi should heal its rift with the Somali government, and thus help calm tensions between Mogadishu and its peripheries.

I.Overview

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has emerged in recent months as an important protagonist in the Horn of Africa. Through political alliances, aid, investment, military base agreements and port contracts, it is expanding its influence in the region. A recent manifestation came in the summer of 2018, when Eritrea and Ethiopia announced – after a flurry of visits to and from Emirati officials – that they had reached an agreement to end their twenty-year war. Emirati and Saudi diplomacy and aid were pivotal to that deal. Elsewhere, however, Gulf countries have played a less constructive role. Competition between the UAE and Saudi Arabia, on the one hand, and Qatar on the other, spilled into Somalia beginning in late 2017, aggravating friction between Mogadishu and Somali regional leaders. Abu Dhabi’s relations with the Somali government have collapsed. As its influence in the Horn grows, the UAE should build on its Eritrea-Ethiopia peace-making by continuing to underwrite and promote that deal, while at the same time looking to reconcile with the Somali government.

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An array of calculations shapes the UAE’s actions in the Horn. The Gulf port cities have a long history of ties with Africa, centred around maritime trade and dating to the era before the Emirates united as a nation-state. From 2011, however, Abu Dhabi began to look at the countries along the Red Sea coast as more than commercial partners. Turmoil in the Middle East, Iran’s growing regional influence, piracy emanating from Somalia and, from 2015, the war in Yemen combined to turn the corridor’s stability into a core strategic interest. The 2017 Gulf crisis, which saw Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt cut ties with Qatar, pushed leaders on both sides of the divide to double down on their alliances, including in the Horn. Since then, the UAE has nailed down diplomatic relationships and extended its reach, particularly along the Red Sea.

 In places, Gulf rivalries have been destabilising. 

In places, Gulf rivalries have been destabilising. In Somalia in particular, the UAE, perceiving the Somali government of President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed “Farmajo” as too close to Qatar and keen to protect years of investment, has deepened its relations with the governments of Somalia’s regions, or federal states. Importing the Gulf crisis into Somalia has contributed to tensions between Mogadishu and the federal states that over recent months have threatened to boil over. Elsewhere, however, Abu Dhabi’s peace-making is evident. The UAE, together with Saudi Arabia, provided critical diplomatic and financial support to help Eritrea and Ethiopia take the first steps toward a rapprochement that could prove enormously beneficial for wider Horn stability. Both Gulf monarchies also appear to have contributed to an easing of tensions between Ethiopia and Egypt.

The UAE, along with its fellow Gulf monarchies, is investing in the Red Sea and Horn of Africa for the long haul. Ideally, its successful Eritrea-Ethiopia diplomacy would provide the basis for that engagement. To that end, it should consider the following:

  • Keep underwriting Eritrean-Ethiopian peace, including by releasing the aid it has promised and pressing Asmara and Addis Ababa to follow through on the September agreement they signed in Jeddah;
  • Seek to end its debilitating spat with Mogadishu, with the understanding that warmer Abu Dhabi-Mogadishu relations are likely a prerequisite for overcoming divisions between President Farmajo’s government and Somali regional leaders. The UAE could encourage allies in the regions to reconcile with Mogadishu and take steps to facilitate their doing so, for example pledging to inform Farmajo’s government of its activities in the federal states, from training security forces to developing ports.

II.The UAE’s Long Involvement in the Horn

When the Eritrean and Ethiopian leaders signed the September agreement, Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s role in brokering it was in full view. The ceremony took place in Jeddah, on Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea coast. The two African leaders sat in an opulent room under the gaze of a metres-high portrait of the founding Saudi king, Abdulaziz. The current king, Salman, looked on, flanked by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and the Emirati foreign minister, Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed. The traditional regional powerbrokers – Western countries, the UN and the African Union (AU) – were absent.

The Eritrean-Ethiopian rapprochement, as well as a flurry of other Horn of Africa diplomacy, has greatly boosted Gulf states’ visibility as geopolitical actors along the Red Sea. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are now central to conversations about the future of a region still suffering strife and instability. With Washington seemingly in retreat, the Gulf countries appear intent on playing a major role. As one Gulf official put it: “If you look at the future of Africa, it’s clear – China is in. The Arab countries are in. The U.S. is not”. The larger questions are what each Gulf country aims to gain and how each intends to use its newly acquired leverage.

 The UAE itself has a long track record of engagement across the Red Sea. 

The UAE itself has a long track record of engagement across the Red Sea. It hosts large diasporas from Horn countries, some of which were integral to its founding in 1971. Arabic-speaking Sudanese civil servants helped build nascent ministries, and members of the diaspora still swap stories about how President Omar al-Bashir was once Khartoum’s military attaché in Abu Dhabi. Dubai, meanwhile, is the banking hub for many Somali businesses.

The Emirates’ history as a trading coast also informs its contemporary economic outreach. The UAE’s model of economic diversification is built around its role as a logistics hub and regional headquarters. It is a model premised on freedom of maritime navigation, including through Bab al-Mandab, the narrow passage from the Gulf of Aden to the Red Sea, and the Strait of Hormuz. Analysts often describe both bodies of water as chokepoints because they are easily closed to oil tankers and other cargo ships. Having cooperative, even like-minded governments along the Red Sea corridor is a strategic priority. Africa is also a natural theatre for trade and logistical ambitions. It comes as no surprise that one of the Dubai-based logistics giant DP World’s first contracts abroad was in Djibouti, where it began to develop Doraleh port in 2006.

III.The Arab Uprisings and a New Emirati Stance Abroad

The 2011 Arab uprisings vested the Red Sea with strategic importance for the UAE beyond core economic interests and led Abu Dhabi to view that corridor, as well as places as seemingly far-flung as Jordan and Libya, as its “neighbourhood”. Those uprisings transformed the Middle East from a zone of entrenched autocracies into a web of conflicts that political Islamists associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, whom the UAE and Saudi Arabia view as enemies, initially seemed to be winning. Abu Dhabi, in particular, views groups affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, which have traction inside the Emirates, as an existential threat. Their ascendancy as far away as North Africa alarmed the Emirates, particularly as conflicts across the Arab world increasingly appeared interlinked, with events in one place shaping those elsewhere.

A growing sense of danger bred a more interventionist foreign policy. The UAE, like Saudi Arabia and Qatar, funnelled support to allies in Libya, Egypt and elsewhere. To explain these actions to citizens at home – used to an economically focused UAE – Emirati leaders invoked an argument still oft-repeated in policymaking hallways in Abu Dhabi: you can’t be safe if your neighbourhood is at war.

Egypt’s future took on particular importance after its first democratic election in modern history brought a Muslim Brotherhood leader, Mohamed Morsi, to the presidency. After Morsi’s ouster in a coup that the UAE and Saudi Arabia lauded and may have actively encouraged, Abu Dhabi and Riyadh, together with Kuwait, poured billions into the new government’s coffers. Abu Dhabi also kept a keen eye on the security of the Suez Canal, including when the scale of piracy in the Red Sea, the canal’s southern gateway, jumped in the mid-2010s. Seeing a risk to its oil shipments and cargo containers, the UAE took an active role in counter-piracy initiatives. In Somalia, it trained a marine police force in the semi-autonomous region of Puntland and began experimenting with counter-terrorism operations against the Islamist Al Shabaab insurgency. The country became a Petri dish of learning for UAE special forces, which Western defence officials describe as the most capable in the Gulf today.

IV.The Yemen Catalyst

By 2015, the tumult in the Middle East – the Islamic State’s rise, Libya’s collapse, the Syria inferno, instability in post-coup Egypt and fear at what some Gulf leaders saw as Iran’s increasing influence across the region – created a siege mentality in some Gulf monarchies. In that context, Saudi Arabia and its primary partner the UAE led a military intervention in Yemen to roll back Huthi rebels loosely allied with Tehran. The Huthis had ousted the president and taken control of the capital and much of the country in late 2014 and early 2015.

In its anti-Iran drive, Riyadh sought assistance from past allies Sudan and Eritrea, both of which had strengthened ties with Tehran while all three countries were under international sanctions. Beginning in the 1990s, Sudan had built its defence industry with Iranian assistance and know-how; Eritrea had offered use of its port, Assab, to the Iranian navy. In 2014, however, both countries ejected Iranian diplomats. A year later, both agreed to contribute troops and resources for the Yemen war.

At the outset of the Yemen conflict, the UAE and Saudi Arabia were alarmed by Huthi rebels’ gains around Bab al-Mandab, raising the possibility that an Iranian-allied group would control such a chokepoint. They prioritised retaking Yemen’s western and southern coastlines. The UAE took de facto responsibility for operations in Yemen’s south and quickly found itself in need of a naval and air base along the Red Sea. The natural candidate was Djibouti, where DP World had built the port. By then, however, Abu Dhabi’s relationship with Djibouti was souring over allegations of corruption related to DP World’s contract (DP World disputes the allegations). Officials from the two countries had a falling-out in April 2015, when the UAE, with DP World’s infrastructure, sought to use Djibouti as a military launching pad into Yemen.

The Saudi-led coalition turned to another port, Eritrea’s Assab. Riyadh signed a security agreement also that April to use Assab, leaving Abu Dhabi to carry out the deal’s terms. By September, the Emirati military was flying fighter-bombers from the Eritrean coastline.

The dispute with Djibouti left the UAE uneasy about its reach along the Red Sea corridor. Abu Dhabi worried that it could not rely on allies in the Horn – even in cases where it felt existential questions were at stake. As UAE-backed Yemeni forces pushed northward along the Red Sea coast, Abu Dhabi sought to expand its strategic depth. DP World and the Emirati military each penned an agreement to develop Berbera port in the self-declared republic of Somaliland. A subsidiary of DP World later signed a contract with local authorities in the Somali federal state of Puntland to develop Bosaso port. The attitude, as one Emirati official put it, became “fill space, before others do”.

V.The Intra-Gulf Crisis

The June 2017 Gulf crisis brought yet more urgency to the scramble along the Red Sea corridor. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt cut ties with and imposed an embargo on Qatar.

Among the reasons the UAE in particular cited for breaking ties with Qatar was Doha’s alleged betrayal of the Saudi-led coalition efforts in Yemen. The Qataris had sent few personnel to the war theatre, but Abu Dhabi accused them of having revealed the location of a UAE-led operation to al-Qaeda, resulting in Emirati casualties, though they provided no evidence to support that allegation. (Qatar at the time declined to respond to this specific claim, and urged the UAE to provide evidence. ) After they imposed an air and naval blockade on Yemen, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi continued to claim that Doha was working actively against Saudi-led efforts, particularly through the media.

Also at the outset of the Gulf crisis, both sides began a frantic diplomatic push to secure allies, including among countries in Africa. In the Horn, competition was particularly fraught, given this subregion’s strategic value and proximity to Yemen. Djibouti and Eritrea both issued statements of support for the Saudi alliance, prompting Qatar to withdraw 400 observers it had stationed to monitor a border dispute between the two.

In Somalia, Farmajo, who had assumed office only months before the Gulf crisis, reportedly faced intense Saudi and Emirati pressure to cut ties with Doha. Although the president insisted that he wanted to remain neutral, for Abu Dhabi, widespread reports that he had received Qatari funds before his election belied that claim, as did his post-election appointment as chief aide of a former Al Jazeera correspondent with links to Doha. In April 2018, Somali authorities seized from a UAE plane almost $10 million in cash that Abu Dhabi said was intended to fund training of security forces that had long been underway but which Mogadishu alleged would be used to fund its political rivals.

In the aftermath of the spat, Abu Dhabi withdrew some officials from Mogadishu, evacuated a military training camp and shuttered a hospital. The UAE also shored up its alliances with leaders in Somalia’s federal states and the breakaway republic of Somaliland. It stuck to previous port agreements in Berbera and Bosaso, as well as a military base agreement for Berbera, and reportedly is discussing the development of Kismayo, in Jubbaland federal state, over the Somali federal government’s objections. The Gulf powers’ backing of rival factions – notably Emirati support for the governments of Somalia’s federal states and Qatari support for Farmajo – has exacerbated existing tensions between Mogadishu and the regions to the point of near-conflict.

The dust-up in Mogadishu is often described by officials in Abu Dhabi as a “wake-up call” – the most blaring signal that the UAE’s interests were imperilled along the African side of the Red Sea. For Abu Dhabi, the timing was inauspicious as well. Emirati-backed Yemeni forces had been gearing up for an offensive to move toward the Huthi-controlled port of Hodeida – an operation that was to rely heavily on assets parked across the sea in Assab. If past alliances with Djibouti and Somalia could turn on a dime, perhaps other seemingly assured relationships – such as with Eritrea – could do so, too.

VI.The Ethiopia-Eritrea Peace Deal

As the UAE’s relations with the Somali federal government soured, a new prime minister emerged in Ethiopia whose reformist economic views appealed to Abu Dhabi. Both countries had already begun laying the groundwork for closer ties some years ago. In March 2013, the two agreed to form a joint commission to discuss economic, political and other cooperation. In April 2018, the selection by Ethiopia’s ruling coalition of a new and charismatic prime minister, Abiy Ahmed, paired with Abu Dhabi’s desire for a new partner in the Horn, catalysed a quicker alignment. As Abiy spoke of privatisation and development to unleash the potential of the Horn’s most populous country, the UAE saw a strategic and investment opportunity. Among the many constraints on Ethiopia’s growth has been its lack of sea access and consequent reliance on Djibouti as the sole outlet for its exports. The UAE’s newly signed port contracts could help. In March 2018, DP World announced that Addis Ababa would take a 19 per cent stake in the Berbera port’s development.

Now, with an energetic partner and a cornucopia of potential commercial opportunities lying in wait in Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia, Abu Dhabi launched a series of meetings and mutual delegations in a bid to forge strong ties with Abiy. Abu Dhabi’s and Riyadh’s relationships with Eritrea positioned them well to help facilitate rapprochement between Asmara and Addis Ababa, once leaders in those capitals were ready. Abu Dhabi pledged $3 billion to Ethiopia, an amount that puts the country on par with Egypt as a recipient of UAE assistance. The two Gulf countries assured Eritrea, meanwhile, that they would help lobby for the lifting of international sanctions in the coming months. If sanctions go, Assab – which has been modernised for military sorties but not for container ships – will almost certainly be the next port to go to market for commercial development.

 As seen from the Gulf, the Ethiopia-Eritrea peace deal has both economic and strategic layers. 

As seen from the Gulf, the Ethiopia-Eritrea peace deal has both economic and strategic layers. Amid the UAE’s strategic setbacks in Djibouti and Somalia, the Ethiopia-Eritrea deal in many ways cements Abu Dhabi’s role as a player in Horn politics. In the weeks since the agreement was announced, Ethiopia’s prime minister also has helped spearhead efforts to improve relations with Somalia, which may in turn help smooth the rough patch between Mogadishu and Abu Dhabi – though for now little suggests rapprochement will come any time soon.

Both Abu Dhabi and Riyadh also appear to have helped behind the scenes Prime Minister Abiy’s efforts to improve relations with Egypt, another old foe. Abiy visited Cairo in June and publicly reassured Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi that Ethiopian development projects – notably the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, which Egypt fears could severely curtail its supply of Nile water – would not harm Egypt. Sisi has also taken a conciliatory approach, saying he recognises that there is no military solution to the dispute. At the same time, Saudi Arabia has helped start a dialogue between Eritrea and Djibouti over a decade-long border conflict. Though that dialogue is still in its early days, after an initial meeting between the two countries’ leaders in Jeddah in September 2018, Djiboutian President Ismail Omar Guelleh told Saudi media that relations had “entered the normalisation phase”. In a sense, both Abu Dhabi and Riyadh are creating facts on the ground in the Horn. In the process, they are becoming forces that cannot easily be ignored.

The payoff could be enormous for regional integration, infrastructure development and connectivity across the Red Sea. Just with regard to ports, the Horn remains one of the most underserved areas of the world relative to population, with a single modern multi-use deep-water port at Doraleh, in Djibouti.

Yet because competition with adversaries also drives the push into the Horn, risks are at least as prominent as opportunities. The contrast between the roles played by the Gulf powers in Ethiopia and Somalia is instructive. At one moment, Gulf involvement in the Horn, even if motivated in part by rivalry between two Middle East axes, can move things in the right direction, as it has with Abiy’s push for peace with Eritrea. At another, those same rivalries can destabilise and divide.

VII.Conclusion

The UAE signals repeatedly that its engagement with Africa is here to stay. In 2018, it is opening an additional six embassies on the continent, adding to the more than a dozen already there. As one Emirati official put it: “We need to diversify and strengthen our relationships outside our own region. If we only pay attention to the Middle East and North Africa, we will be bogged down in crisis. We could miss a lot of opportunities around the globe”.

While credit for the Ethiopia-Eritrea deal lies primarily with the leaders of those two countries, clearly Gulf powers, especially the UAE, played an important role in helping push forward the initial steps of a rapprochement that could be significant across the Horn. The deal demonstrated that the UAE and Saudi Arabia can play important peace-making roles. Abu Dhabi and its peers can encourage regional economic integration and help give leaders in the Horn the extra boost, including both political and financial support, they might need to make peace. Such was the story of Eritrea and Ethiopia – two countries that saw domestic interests in making peace but needed the right economic and diplomatic assurances from abroad.

The months ahead will be crucial for the success of that deal. Abiy faces enormous hurdles in his quest to reform the economy and consolidate political support. Eritrea’s reopening to the world will undoubtedly encounter unexpected challenges. For the Jeddah deal to succeed, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi will need to work proactively to keep the parties on track. They can begin by promptly following through on their aid commitments.

 Despite the bright spot of Eritrea-Ethiopia peace-making, intra-Gulf competition colours Emirati involvement across the Horn. 

Yet despite the bright spot of Eritrea-Ethiopia peace-making, intra-Gulf competition colours Emirati involvement across the Horn. Whether the killing of Saudi Arabian journalist Jamal Khashoggi in Saudi Arabia’s Istanbul consulate will lead to some form of rapprochement within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), as some reports suggest might happen, remains unclear. But even if so, the Saudi-UAE alliance is still likely to view actors such as Qatar and Turkey as competitors in strategic theatres like the Horn. Moreover, while for now Tehran’s influence is largely limited to the Yemeni side of the Red Sea, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi’s engagement in the Horn is likely to remain informed by their determination to ensure Iran does not regain a foothold, including by winning back its former allies Sudan and Eritrea.

The damage that external rivalries can inflict on the Horn was made clear in Somalia, where friction among Gulf powers, and in turn between the UAE and Farmajo’s government, has exacerbated pre-existing tension over how power and resources are divvied up between the capital and the regions. Abu Dhabi says that it wants a stable Somalia, but the country is likely to remain volatile unless strong Emirati ties to Somali regional leaders are paired with a reconciled UAE relationship with Mogadishu. Abu Dhabi could pledge to inform Farmajo’s government of its activities in the federal states – whether training security forces or developing ports – and ensure that its investment and aid benefit the country and not only its regions. The UAE also might encourage its allies in the federal states to repair their own ties to Mogadishu.

Abu Dhabi faces a choice in how much its Middle Eastern rivalries shape its Horn engagement. If competition remains a primary driver, results will almost certainly be mixed. In some places the UAE may still help bridge divides, even if partly motivated by shoring up its own influence at the expense of rivals. Elsewhere, however, competition could put Horn governments in a difficult spot, forcing them to choose between the two Gulf axes or exacerbating local conflicts in new ways. Ultimately, zero-sum competition in the Horn risks upsetting both the internal politics of the region’s diverse states and the balance of power among those states. Outside powers may win short-term gains, but over time everyone stands to lose from greater Horn instability.

Eritrean President isaias afawerki will soon visit to Djibouti

Addis Ababa, December 6, 2018 (FBC) -Djibouti’s foreign minister on Wednesday said Eritrean President Isaias Afeworki will pay a visit to his country “soon”.

Djibouti and Eritrea have been maintaining high level contacts after Ethiopia’s recommendation for a region-wide thaw was accepted across the board.

“We don’t have a date yet, but the two presidents will exchange visits soon,” Mahamoud Ali Youssouf told Anadolu Agency in an exclusive interview as he attended Ethiopian Day organized on the sidelines of the ongoing 2nd Djibouti International Trade Fair.

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“The two presidents met in September and I met my Eritrean counterpart. We will build on that momentum. Confidence should be built,” he said.

“Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed is launching initiatives that create conducive environment for the reconciliation and he broadened the scope of the stability and prospect for peace in the region,” he said.

Youssouf said, “This has to be acknowledged and recognized [because] the prime minister has been instrumental in the new momentum.”

He described the region as the most volatile in Africa.

“In comparison with other regions in Africa, this region [the Horn of Africa] has been trapped in a number of crises; some of them internal like the case in Somalia, and some external like the case between Eritrea and Djibouti.

“I think that we needed a visionary leader who could think regional and see the opportunities for countries to come together, plan together, and work for the benefit of the people of the region,” Youssouf added.

“We are very optimistic, he said, “Because we have seen the first signals of the development of the situation. In the future we will see more of it.”

Relations between Eritrea and Djibouti have been tense since the 1980s due to land claims.

In June 2008, the two countries fought a three-day war after Djibouti claimed that Eritrean forces dug trenches on its side of the border.

Ilhan Omar Arrested in 2013 For Trespassing, Booked At Hennepin County Jail

 

State Rep. Ilhan Omar was arrested in 2013 for trespassing and booked at Hennepin County Jail “to prevent further criminal conduct,” according to a newly uncovered police report.

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The incident took place on January 18, 2013 following an event at the Minneapolis Convention Center featuring former Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud. The Somali president was set to stay the night at the Hotel Ivy, causing large groups of Somalis to follow the presidential convoy to the hotel, including Omar.

According to the police report, hotel staff requested police assistance in clearing the lobby, saying that anyone without a hotel room key was not welcome on the premises and needed to leave immediately. The officer handling the incident said the majority of people who were asked to leave were compliant. However, Omar, when approached, was “argumentative” and refused to leave.

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“As she stood her ground and refused to leave I took hold of her left elbow to escort her from the lobby. Omar then pulled away from me stating, ‘Don’t put your hands on me!’ Others in her group complied and began walking toward the front entry/exit door as I ordered and I managed to coax Omar out with them,” the police report reads.

Ten minutes after the original encounter, the officer reports finding Omar seated in a different area of the lobby. According to the officer’s account, Omar “remained defiant” as he informed her that she would be arrested for trespassing if she didn’t leave.

Since she refused to comply with orders, the officer arrested Omar. The officer reached for Omar’s left arm to get her to stand so she could be handcuffed, but she pulled away. The officer handcuffed her while she stayed seated in the hotel lobby chair.

“Omar was booked at [Hennepin County Jail] as I felt it was likely that she would fail to respond to a citation and she also demonstrated that she was going to continue her criminal behavior,” the officer wrote.

View the police report below:

Ethiopia Recalls its more than 90 long serving Diplomats

Ethiopian more than 90 diplomats who have been appointed in Embassies and Consular offices of finding in different parts of the world and served between four and 25 years.

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Ethiopian Foreign Minister Spokes Person Office announced yesterday that the diplomats are expected to report to the Ministry in two months time.

Parallelly other 130 diplomatic are also assigned to embassies after having the necessary training, according to the Ministry.

As the reallocation of Embassy workers approved by the prime minister, diplomats who are working in different parts of the world will be reshuffled in recent time, said the Ministry spokesperson office.

The new appointment will be based on human resource assignment criteria which is believed to strengthen the professional skills in the ministry.

After the coming of the new leadership, the ministry has announced the reshuffle of Ambassadors.

Currently, Ethiopia maintains 43 embassies abroad as well as 47 consulates. The Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa hosts 115 embassies, and in addition, there are three consulates and one other representation in Ethiopia.

Updated list of Unrecognized countries of 🌎

400px-Limited_recognition
UN member states which at least one other UN member state does not recognise Non-UN member states and observer states recognised by at least one UN member state Non-UN member states recognised by other non-UN member states only Non-UN member state not recognised by any state

A number of polities have declared independence and sought diplomatic recognition from the international communityas de jure sovereign states, but have not been universally recognised as such. These entities often have de facto control of their territory. A number of such entities have existed in the past.

There are two traditional doctrines that provide indicia of how a de jure sovereign state comes into being. The declarative theorydefines a state as a person in international law if it meets the following criteria:

  1. a defined territory
  2. a permanent population
  3. a government, and
  4. a capacity to enter into relations with other states.

According to the declarative theory, an entity’s statehood is independent of its recognition by other states. By contrast, the constitutive theory defines a state as a person of international law only if it is recognised as such by other states that are already a member of the international community.[1]

Proto-states often reference either or both doctrines in order to legitimise their claims to statehood. There are, for example, entities which meet the declarative criteria (with de facto partial or complete control over their claimed territory, a government and a permanent population), but whose statehood is not recognised by any other states. Non-recognition is often a result of conflicts with other countries that claim those entities as integral parts of their territory. In other cases, two or more partially recognised states may claim the same territorial area, with each of them de facto in control of a portion of it (as have been the cases of the Republic of China (Taiwan) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and North and South Korea). Entities that are recognised by only a minority of the world’s states usually reference the declarative doctrine to legitimise their claims.

In many situations, international non-recognition is influenced by the presence of a foreign military force in the territory of the contested entity, making the description of the country’s de facto status problematic. The international community can judge this military presence too intrusive, reducing the entity to a puppet state where effective sovereignty is retained by the foreign power. Historical cases in this sense can be seen in Japanese-led Manchukuo or the German-created Slovak Republic and Independent State of Croatia before and during World War II. In the 1996 case Loizidou v. Turkey, the European Court of Human Rights judged Turkey for having exercised authority in the territory of Northern Cyprus.

There are also entities which do not have control over any territory or do not unequivocally meet the declarative criteria for statehood but have been recognised to exist de jure as sovereign entities by at least one other state. Historically this has happened in the case of the Holy See (1870–1929), EstoniaLatvia and Lithuania (during Soviet annexation), and more recently the State of Palestine at the time of its declaration of independence in 1988. The Sovereign Military Order of Malta is currently in this position. See list of governments in exile for unrecognised governments without control over the territory claimed.

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There are 193 United Nations (UN) member states, while both the Holy See and the State of Palestine have observer state status in the United Nations.[2] However, some countries fulfill the declarative criteria, are recognised by the large majority of other states and are members of the United Nations, but are still included in the list here because one or more other states do not recognise their statehood, due to territorial claims or other conflicts.

Some states maintain informal (officially non-diplomatic) relations with states that do not officially recognise them. The Republic of China (Taiwan) is one such state, as it maintains unofficial relations with many other states through its Economic and Cultural Offices, which allow regular consular services. This allows the ROC to have economic relations even with states that do not formally recognise it. A total of 56 states, including Germany,[3] Italy,[4] the United States,[5] and the United Kingdom,[6] maintain some form of unofficial mission in the ROC. Kosovo,[7] the Republic of Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh),[8]the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus,[9]Abkhazia,[10] Transnistria,[10] the Sahrawi Republic,[11] Somaliland,[12] and Palestine[13]also host informal diplomatic missions, and/or maintain special delegations or other informal missions abroad.

Present geopolitical entities by level of recognition

UN member states not recognised by at least one UN member state

Name Declared Status Other claimants Further information References
 South Korea 1948 South Korea, independent since 1948, is not recognised by one UN member, North Korea.  North Koreaclaims to be the sole legitimate government of Korea. Foreign relations, missions (ofto) [14][15]
 Republic of Armenia 1991 Armenia, independent since 1991, is not recognised by one UN member, Pakistan, as Pakistan has a position of supporting Azerbaijansince the Nagorno-Karabakh War. None Foreign relations, missions (ofto) [16][17]
 Republic of Cyprus 1960 The Republic of Cyprus, independent since 1960, is not recognised by one UN member (Turkey) and one UN non-member (Northern Cyprus), due to the ongoing civil dispute over the island.  Northern Cyprusclaims part of the island of Cyprus. Foreign relations, missions (ofto) [18][19][20][21]
 North Korea 1948 North Korea, independent since 1948, is not recognised by three UN members: FranceJapanSouth Korea; and one non-UN member: Taiwan.[22][23][24][original research?][25][26]  South Koreaclaims to be the sole legitimate government of Korea. Foreign relations, missions (ofto) [24][27][28][25][26]
 People’s Republic of China 1949 The People’s Republic of China (PRC), proclaimed in 1949, is the more widely recognised of the two claimant governments of “China”, the other being the Republic of China (ROC, also known as Taiwan). The PRC does not accept diplomatic relations with states that recognise the ROC (16 UN members and the Holy See as of 21 August 2018). Most of these states do not officially recognise the PRC as a state, though some states have established relations with the ROC while stating they do not intend to stop recognising the PRC (Kiribati, Nauru).[29][30] Some states which currently recognise only the PRC have attempted simultaneous recognition and relations with the ROC and the PRC in the past (Liberia, Vanuatu).[31][32][33] According to United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758, the PRC is the only legitimate representative of China to the United Nations.[a]  Republic of Chinaclaims to be the sole legitimate government over all of China under the Constitution of the Republic of China.

Foreign relations, missions (ofto)


PRC’s diplomatic relations dates of establishment

[34]
 State of Israel 1948 Israel, founded in 1948, is not recognised by 31 UN members.  Syriaclaims the Golan Heights.
 Lebanonclaims Shebaa Farms.
 Palestineclaims areas controlled by Israel. Subject to the ongoing Israeli–Palestinian peace process and broader Arab-Israeli peace process.
Foreign relations, missions (ofto)


International recognition

[35][36][37][38]
[39]

UN observer states not recognised by at least one UN member state

Name Declared Status Other claimants Further information References
 State of Palestine 1988 The Palestinian Liberation Organization(PLO) declaredthe State of Palestine in 1988. At the time the Israeli Armed Forces had control of most of the proclaimed territory.[40] It is recognised by 137 UN member states, the Holy See,[41]and the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic.[42]Today the PLC (Palestinian Legislative Council) executes the government functions in all Palestinian territories outside of Israeli military-controlled zones. Prior to the Council’s administration, the Palestinian National Authority(PNA) was established in 1994 according to the Oslo Accords and the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement.[b]Palestine participates in the United Nations as an observer state,[43] and has membership in the Arab League, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperationand UNESCO.[44] It was accorded non-member observer state status at the United Nations by United Nations General Assembly resolution 67/19.  Israeldoes not recognise the state of Palestine and controls areas claimed by Palestine.[b]Subject to the ongoing Israeli–Palestinian peace process+

WorldRemit Links Up To WhatsApp For Its Remittance Service

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WorldRemit Links Up To WhatsApp For Its Remittance Service
By admin – September 19, 20180
WorldRemit Links Up To WhatsApp For Its Remittance Service

worldremit-and-WhatsApp (1)
Leading digital money transfer company WorldRemit has added WhatsApp notifications to its service.

Through its integration with the WhatsApp Business solution, customers who use WhatsApp to chat with family and friends can now also receive instant notifications on the status of their transactions.

Given the challenges of SMS delivery in many markets, customers can often miss out on real-time information about their transfers. WhatsApp’s high reliability and sustainability will provide WorldRemit customers with even more choice in their communications preferences.

WorldRemit is the first fintech company in the U.K. to integrate with the WhatsApp Business solution. Pioneering a mobile-first approach to the $600bn a year remittance industry, this integration supports WorldRemit’s goal of serving 10 million customers connected to emerging markets by 2020.

Alice Newton-Rex, Chief Product Officer at WorldRemit, comments: “WorldRemit is delighted to add the WhatsApp Business solution to its platform to further improve its service by enabling our customers to receive instant updates on transactions.”

“This integration will make our safe, fast and low-cost remittance service even more convenient for millions of WorldRemit customers around the world.”

WorldRemit enables migrants to send money from their smartphones to the people they love in over 145 countries. Its customers make 1.2 million transactions every month using its app or website.

Declare State Of National Urgency (military takeover) in Ethiopia: Remove Abiy Ahmed,

  1. In general

In light of the barbaric and horrifying murders, rapes, dehumanizing treatments and looting of ethnic minorities in the suburbs of Addis Ababa on two consecutive days of 15 and 16 of September 2018, much has been written by journalists, and heart wrenching statements were also made by individuals who lived through the horrors. Similar attacks on minorities had been the characteristic feature of PM Abiy Ahmed’s reign of ineffective governance since his ascendance to the premiership “throne” on 2 April 2018. He has made “fantastic” speeches like mena to the hungry ears of millions of Ethiopians who were used to the diatribe of uninspiring dry speeches of former Prime Ministers from the EPRDF coalition successive governments. In no way such hunger endorses the inept government of Abiy Ahmed now.

I see Abiy Ahmed jetting around the World in an ultramodern Ethiopian Airlines Boeing 787; specifically engaged in high profile international flights to the United States (Los Angeles, Minnesota, New York, and Washington DC), to the Arab World (Abu Dhabi, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia), and to neighboring African States (Djibouti, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, Somaliland and Sudan). He seems to love flying on some unnecessary pretexts. It seems also that the people around him, such as Demeke Mekonnen, encourage him to do that for in his absence they do their corrupt deeds. In my calculation after researching Airports rental charges around the world (Reagan, Los Angeles, Minnesota Airports and other Airports in Africa and the Middle East) and lost revenue for the B787s, Abiy Ahmed has wasted the equivalent of over fifteen million dollars in lost revenue and out of pocket expenses for the B787s, landing and takeoff fees, airport parking fees for the planes, etc. Please, someone tell this peasant that Boeing Jetliners are not toys and to stop abusing his Premiership using national property in such wasteful manners.

TPLF should consider primary elections for its members that would like to be elected to state or federal parliament

PM Abiy Ahmed has failed in his most important and sacred duty as a leader of protecting and securing the welfare of Ethiopians that were brutally murdered in like Ashewa Meda and Burayu et cetera in the suburban towns and communities of Addis Ababa by Oromos who seem to have been instigated by the recent arrivals of OLF leadership and by Jawar Mohammed and his group and also by local Oromo politicians, such as Bekele Gerba who had formatted, agitated even directly or indirectly ordered the massacre of minorities living in so called Oromo Kilil. What was Abiy Ahmed doing when such massacre was taking place right under his Palace Gates? He was in Jedda signing some agreement, whose content the Ethiopian public or its Representatives do not know about, with Issaias Afeworki under the gaze of their new patron the brutish Saudi king Salman bin Abdul-Aziz. It is to be remembered that years back when Salman was Governor of Riyadh (1965-2011) tens of thousands of Ethiopians were hunted down as illegal immigrants and some were murdered, and some thrown into jail and inhumanly tortured et cetera. He was also engaged in subversive activities assisting terroristic political groups, including the ELF, EPLF of Issaias Afeworki, fighting against the Government of Emperor Haile Selassie and all succeeding Ethiopian Governments to this day. I do not trust scorpions.

Both the Oromo Kilil police and the Federal Police did not do any degree of protection to the Ethiopians being murdered, raped, and their property being looted. I suspect that some members of the security forces of Oromo Kilil might be some of the brutal attackers. However, they were eager to shoot non-Oromos demonstrating against the previous days massacres incommunities around Addis Ababa. At any rate, listening to the Federal Police Commissioner General Zeynu Jemal’s excuses for their failure to protect the victims is sickening.

When people were demonstrating against the massacre, the Police shot and killed five individuals and wounding several others. Zeynu lied claiming that the victims were attacking the security forces, and his lie was exposed by eyewitness account, by individuals who were at the area when the five innocent civilians were shot to death. Zeynu must resign or must be fired immediately. This form of behavior illustrates the rotting system we have under Abiy Ahmed where he had stacked his governmental offices with Oromos and Moslems with less than a percent from other ethnic groups and Orthodox Christians. I invite you to check the list of his Ministers, newly appointed Ambassadors, and newly installed Officials of government Agencies and you will see my point how he is staking Governmental Officials with Oromos and Moslems. I am for proportionate distribution of governmental appointments.

Yes, Abiy Ahmed lies all the time eclipsing even President Donald Trump. Abiy lied both by omission of necessary reports to the people of Ethiopia, and also lied by presenting false hopes and polarizing rhetoric on morality and offering Ethiopians unreachable ideals. For example, the Ethiopian public has no idea what he or his surrogates are agreeing to in such international agreements he or his surrogates are signing in Addis Ababa, Asmara, Jedda, Cairo, Abu Dhabi, Nairobi, et cetera. He blames former TPLF leaders and other unnamed groups as the causes behind the current turmoil and the displacement of millions of minorities in Somali, Oromo, and Amhara Kilils. The problem is Abiy Ahmed himself, for he does not seem to know what he is supposed to do at home as a leader providing proper leadership.

A recent article with a cynical title by Seifeselassie Gebre listed twenty-five serious treasonous errors committed by PM Abiy Ahmed. Any one of them could be cause for impeaching Abiy Ahmed from his post and replace him with someone capable and patriotic and not serving the interest of an ethnic group and/or Arabs. [see 25 Greatest Achievements of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed in the Past 5 Months, Tigrai Online, 19 sept 2018.

25 Greatest Achievements of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed

Look at one such item for impeachment: “(25) there is a narcissist Prime Minister who is more concerned about his personal fame and self-aggrandizement than the peace and stability of his Country and the security and welfare of his people and who is busy making useless and non-stop domestic and foreign visits (shirshirs) while his people are being slaughtered by armed thugs and terrorists, our domestic “ISIS” and his Country is being burned.”

The removal of PM Abiy Ahmed from office is necessary and legitimate in order to save Ethiopia from lasting damage and disintegration.

  1. Military Takeover is a Must

In these bleak Ethiopian days, I am deeply moved by the massacre and uprooting of hundreds of thousands of Ethiopians that I feel I should have fought for power to lead Ethiopia into the mold of the Great Axumite Empire in control of the Horn and Yemen to the Persian Gulf and all of Somalia, Djibouti, and the expanse south to South Africa. As you can read here, I am very frustrated that our Ethiopia decade after decade ends up in the gutter, for We are surrounded with mediocrity, little minds, and disgusting sycophantic intellectuals. My apologies for my ranting, but if you read between the lines of my writings there is great love and admiration for the truly remarkable ancient people that maintained a national identity in freedom and sovereignty throughout human history i.e. We Ethiopians including the recent super nationalists.

I am now fully in support of for military takeover and a declaration of state of urgency and the arrest of all the terrorist leaders of OLF, ONLF, some of ANDM and OPDO leaders directly involved in ethnic cleansing and murders and looting and destruction of property. Jawar and his Group are of special concern for he/they are foreign agents of Arabs and Egypt blatantly still instigating genocide of non-Oromos in Oromo Kilil. Some of the corrupt former leaders of TPLF who have looted great wealth and drove Tigrai into the gutter as the least developed part of Ethiopia must be removed from power.

It is unbelievable that such TPLF leaders did absolutely nothing for Tigrai for the last twenty-seven years worth mentioning though they looted billions for themselves. They did not even solve basic needs, such as proper drinking water sources for Mekelle, Axum, Adwa et cetera while they were developing Oromia, Sidama-Awasa, Addis Ababa et cetera in order to loot hundreds of millions of dollars or equivalent as contractors, vendors et cetera for themselves and their families. They could not even fix the dome of the small chapel (which is completely peeling off) where the Ark of the Covenant is housed. What is tragic is that they could have looted no less by developing Tigrai too, but they have inherent self-hate that seems to be historic too. Dr Debretsion and Memher Muluwork seem to be the only individuals with a degree of integrity and serious concern for people that I trust could bring about national solutions not only for Tigrai Kilil but to the wider needs of the Ethiopian People. The best that could be done under such corrupted Organization to save Ethiopia is to elect new TPLF Leaders without delay.

It was Tigrian warlords [and the TPLF included of late] that devastated Tigrai fighting each other or as agents of two or three Ethiopian Emperors in power at different times [Emperor Menelik and Empress Zewditu and Emperor Haile Selassie]. How often had Amhara Leaders attacked Tigrai? Maybe a couple of times in such a long history. Thus, blaming Amharas in general for such underdevelopment of Tigrai is misplaced and untrue. A little history lesson here is appropriate now. The word “Tigrai” is first recorded representing a small group of petitioners from a little enclave in north Agame as indicated in the Chronicle of Emperor Amdetsion.

The territory under the “Reese Mequanent” itself was much larger than the present day Tigrai Kilil that then included all of Armacheho, Qimante, Semien, Wolkit-Segede, Lasta-Wag, all of Raya and Azebo including Zoble and all the way to Lake Haik near Dessie. What is designated now as Tigrai is a recent reductionist creation by Lij Iyasu when he created his Father as King of Tigrai and Wollo.

Ignore the diminutive Gedu Andargachew and the obese Demeke Mekonnen’s intrigues to devalue and denigrate Tigrians and the TPLF pitting Amharas against Tigrians. Thus, I urge Tigrians to think of Amhara people as family for none are closer than the two historic rivals, and I urge both communities to create more meaningful bonding, for you must save Ethiopia from Arab destructive campaign and from local barbarians. If the rest of Ethiopia is in turmoil, Tigrai cannot be safe. And if Tigrai is in turmoil, the rest of Ethiopia cannot be stable. There is such need for mutually beneficial cooperative effort as your responsibilities. Ignore the recent leaking of the boots of OLF terrorist fighters marching triumphantly through Tigrai Kilil with reception of goodwill by the TPLF Leadership even waving the divisive flag of the OLF by Sebhat Nega and others. Shameful.

  1. How to Safeguard Minorities

These past five months most of us, with internet access, have watched graphically depicted horrendous genocidal crimes committed against peaceful minorities in Amhara, Oromo, and Somali Kilils by organized thugs of the majority population. There is no doubt that Ethiopia is populated by diverse distinct ethnic groups with a range of unequal social and economic development with latent and manifest hostilities to each other. We have seen videos, read heart wrenching accounts of murder and human degradation of minorities living in Oromo Kilil, and to lesser extent in Amhara and Somali Kilils. The one Kilil that is clear of such murderous orgy is the Tigrai Kilil where there is law and order and where minorities are protected from any molestations.

It is important more than ever to arm minorities living in hostile Kilils and provide them with Federal protective enclaves within any hostile Kilils especially in Oromo Kilil and Somali Kilil. There should be early warning systems organized by minorities and systems of detecting subversive internet communications. In fact, I urge the Ethiopian Government to collect and ban all private iPhones in such hostile Kilils and even shut down such satellite services in such urban encroaching rural areas.

Conclusion

It is an existential necessity right now to take over the Ethiopian Government by the Military and remove or impeach Abiy Ahmed and the Amhara and Oromo Kilil Governors. One must move into Addis Ababa a segment of the Ethiopian Military special force to protect major economic institutions such as the Ethiopian Airlines, Banks, International Organizations, Embassies, Diplomats, and the general population. It is an existential necessity to take preemptive actions against the terrorist political movements that had entered Ethiopia through Abiy Ahmed’s policy of forgiveness and “medemer” that was rubberstamped by the House of Representatives. I suggest arresting OLF and ONLF Leaders, Arab agents such as Jawar Mohammed, and homegrown local Oromo violent secessionist Leaders such as Bekele Gerba, et cetera will create temporary upheavals, but their removal from public participation would allow long term benefit and stability to Ethiopia and the region.

It is of no consequence to round up the street thugs and criminals [seven hundred in recent report] that attack minorities when the real instigators of the mob-crimes are free and organizing further unrest and genocidal attacks on non-Oromos. I believe the best defense against terrorist criminals is to organize a defensive force, weaponize oneself by getting armed and carry out sustained drills neighborhood by neighborhood for such future confrontations. Do not listen neither to the flowery speeches of Abiy Ahmed nor expect protection form Abiy Ahmed or his Government. Abiy Ahmed is full of himself, intoxicated by his own words and devoid of real empathy for the suffering of others. He is the most narcissistic leader Ethiopia ever experienced. Long live Historic Ethiopia.

It is time for Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed to resign from power now

Dr. Abiy Ahmed Ali should resign from power right away because he is not fit to lead Ethiopia

Africa times: Dr. Abiy Ahmed Ali should resign from power right away because he is not fit to lead Ethiopia. In less than six months Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed turned Ethiopia to a failed state. All mega projects like the GERD are stopped since he came to power.

Ethiopia is in danger of disintegration more than any time in its history because the prime minister lacks strategic thinking and he is working for foreign powers not for the Ethiopian people. Abiy Ahmed is not an honest leader he is hiding his true intentions for the country. He is secretly working with Gedu Andargachew and Demeke Mekonnen to destroy the federal system, and bring back the imperial system back to Ethiopia.

Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed is showing signs of becoming the worst dictator ever seen in Ethiopia. The recent ugly events around and inside Addis Ababa are most likely the works of his team as a precursor for declaring state of emergency and eventually establish a military rule